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MOTIVE MATTERS: WHY YOU DO 
WHAT YOU DO COUNTS
ot too many prosecutors, or police 
officers for that matter, want to 
gamble on s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Sometimes the gun or drugs get in, but 
sometimes they’re out and the factually 
guilty are found legally innocent and walk free. 
Rather than rolling  the dice in the hopes evidence 
will be admitted, it is far better to build a Charter 
proof case in the first instance. The admissibility 
analysis doesn’t take to kindly to willful breaches. A 
police officer forging  ahead knowing  that their 
actions are violating  constitutional standards is very 
often the evidentiary kiss of death. Deliberate 
breaches or blatant disregard for Charter rights are 
the epitome of bad faith, will aggravate the 
seriousness of state action, and likely support 
exclusion, all other things being equal. 
One thing  to keep in mind is that a police officer’s 
purpose or intention can and often does impact the 
legality of their actions. Motive really does matter. 
The jurisprudence is rife with examples. Just ask the 
Toronto Police officer who stopped a van for traffic 
infractions and saw Milton Harris, a passenger, not 
wearing  his seatbelt as the law required (R. v. Harris, 
2007 ONCA 574). Harris was leaning  forward and 
had his left hand down the small of his back. The 
officer was concerned for his safety and ordered 
everyone to keep their hands where they could be 
seen. He then asked all occupants to identify 
themselves, including  Harris, so he could check 
them out on CPIC. After running  Harris the officer 
learned he was breaching  his bail curfew, arrested 
and searched him, and found cocaine tucked in the 
waistband of his underwear. 
The trial judge threw out the cocaine as evidence, 
finding  that the police breached Harris’ Charter 
rights. Without the cocaine, the Crown had no case 
and Harris was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, 
Ontario’s highest court upheld the lower court’s 
ruling  that asking  Harris to identify himself for the 
purpose of querying  CPIC in the circumstances was 
an unreasonable search and seizure. The Court of 
Appeal, however, noted that the officer could have 
asked Harris to identify himself in order to give him a 
seatbelt ticket. If he did this he could have conducted 
a CPIC inquiry anyways which would have led to the 
same results and the events would have unfolded 
exactly the way they did. As Justice Doherty put it, if 
the officer had properly understood the limits of his 
authorities under Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act and 
turned his mind to issuing  the ticket for not wearing  a 
seatbelt, he would have requested identification for 
that purpose. The officer would have still learned 
Harris was breaching  his bail, arrested him, searched 
him, and found the drugs. Clearly what the officer 
was thinking  made the difference on whether or not 
a Charter breach occurred. On one hand, asking 
Harris for ID to query CPIC was a breach, while on 
the other hand asking  him for ID to issue a ticket and 
then querying CPIC was not! 
Another, perhaps more common motive analysis 
involves provincial motor vehicle legislation 
permitting  random vehicle stops. These types of stops 
pass constitutional muster as a reasonable limit on 
one’s Charter rights if the officer’s reason for stopping 
the vehicle falls within the ambit of traffic safety. 
However, if the officer arbitrarily stops the vehicle for 
reasons only related to general crime prevention or 
detection, the stop will not be saved by s. 1 of the 
Charter. Hence, in both cases there is an arbitrary 
vehicle stop but the constitutionality of the detention 
hinges on the officer’s reason for doing so. 
Motive matters in almost every action police take. Be 
smart. Understand the law.  
N
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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Note-able Quote
“Justice is blind in the sense that it pays no heed to 
the social status or personal characteristics of the 
litigants. But justice receives a black eye when it 
turns a blind eye to unconstitutional searches and 
seizures as a result of unacceptable police conduct 
or practices. The public must have confidence that 
invasions of privacy are justified, in advance, by a 
genuine showing of probable cause.” - Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice Fish, R. v. Morelli 2010 SCC 
8 at para. 110-111. 
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THREE JUDGES, THREE VIEWS 
ON POLICE ACTIONS
R. v. Dault, 2010 QCCA 986 
Shortly after midnight police checked 
a parking  lot behind a car wash 
adjacent to a bar. They knew from 
experience that users of the bar 
regularly parked in the lot. They saw 
several vehicles, including  one occupied by two 
people. The vehicle was running, the lights were off, 
and the windows were defrosted, unlike other 
vehicles in the lot. One officer went to the passenger 
side while another approached the driver’s side. The 
driver's door was ajar and an officer smelled a strong 
odour of alcohol. He knocked on the window, but 
the accused, who did not react, was facing  the 
passenger. The officer at the passenger side noted 
movement of hands on the dashboard of the vehicle 
and the presence of a case with a credit card. He 
opened the door and saw the passenger forming  a 
line of cocaine. He yelled to his partner about the 
drugs. The officer at the driver’s side then opened the 
driver’s door. The accused, occupying  the driver’s 
seat, appeared intoxicated; he was unable to exit the 
car and stand, had a very pasty mouth, difficulty 
speaking, a strong  breath of alcohol, and was 
incoherent. Both men were arrested, informed of 
their rights, and taken to the police station. The 
accused provided two breath samples; 127mg% and 
124mg%. He was charged with ss. 253(a) (impaired) 
and (b) (over 80mg%) of the Criminal Code and 
possession of cocaine under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act. 
At trial in the Court of Quebec one of the officers 
testified he was suspicious and wanted to see what 
the occupants were doing  and whether they were 
capable of driving  the vehicle. The accused argued 
that his detention was illegal and arbitrary under s. 9 
of the Charter and that he was subject to an 
unreasonable search under s. 8, which included 
opening  the car doors. In his view, the evidence 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the police 
were acting  under their general powers to maintain 
peace and public order, crime prevention, and 
public safety. 
The trial judge agreed with the accused and 
concluded that the police action in opening  the 
doors was not justified under Quebec’s Highway 
Safety Code (HSC), the Criminal Code, common law 
or any other law permitting  police to stop people in 
a motor vehicle. The police had no suspicion in 
relation to the commission of a crime, no suspicion 
in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle, 
nor any reasonable or probable grounds or 
articulable cause justifying  such an intervention. The 
detention was arbitrary and the evidence was 
obtained in violation of the accused’s Charter  rights. 
The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted of all charges. The  Crown’s 
appeal to the Quebec Superior Court was 
unsuccessful, so it challenged the lower court’s 
ruling to the Quebec Court of Appeal.  
The Crown again submitted that the police could 
lawfully, under their general powers or under 
provincial motor vehicle legislation, approach the 
accused’s vehicle to check if everything  was okay 
and, having  arrived near it, make more observations 
which justified the accused’s detention and arrest for 
impaired. The accused, on the contrary, suggested 
the police were fishing, had no reason to approach 
the vehicle, and their actions were unconstitutional; 
thus the evidence inadmissible. 
In its decision, the justices of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal delivered three separate opinions. 
Say One (Evidence In)
Justice Dalphond held that the lower courts erred. 
He noted there were six aspects to this case which 
rendered the police action in approaching  the 
vehicle lawful:
1. The police were patrolling  the area when they 
noticed the presence of the vehicle with two 
occupants, its engine running, windows 
defrosted, and lights out. They were not acting 
as part of an investigation nor responding  to a 
call. Rather, they were proceeding  under their 
general powers. 
2. They were in a public space, a parking  lot 
apparently open to all. After parking  their 
Volume 10 Issue 5 - September/October 2010
PAGE 4
vehicle the officers walked toward the accused’s 
car. They did not enter a private area under the 
accused’s control and it was lawful for any 
person to do what the police did without 
violating any law. 
  
3. The accused was in a stationary vehicle, the 
windows were defrosted, and it was in a lighted 
space. Anyone who approached the vehicle 
could then see inside it. The presence in a motor 
vehicle does not attract an expectation of 
privacy for the driver as high as the presence in 
his residence, let alone the passenger. In these 
circumstances the police, like any other person 
who approached the vehicle, could legally 
observe what was happening. 
4. The accused’s vehicle was stopped when the 
officers spotted and approached it on foot to 
conduct a check. The police vehicle (with 
emergency lights off) was not parked in order to 
prevent the departure of the accused’s vehicle. 
The police did not detain the accused or his 
vehicle. A reasonable person would not have 
concluded that a detention had yet crystallized 
5. The driver's side window was ajar and on 
reaching  near the vehicle, the officer noted a 
strong  odour of alcohol. He knocked on the 
driver's window without the accused reacting 
by turning  to him. This, along  with other 
information already noted (eg. near a bar, late 
Saturday night hour, engine running  with 
headlights off), was sufficient to conclude that 
the officer had enough to reasonably suspect 
that the accused had custody or control of a 
vehicle and had consumed alcohol, requiring 
him to submit to coordination tests or to provide 
a breath sample pursuant to s. 254 of the 
Criminal Code. The officer also had reason to 
suspect the presence of alcohol within the 
meaning of s.636.1 of Quebec’s HSC.
6. The police detected the strong  odour of alcohol, 
before they saw the line of cocaine on the 
dashboard of the vehicle. 
The evidence gathered before the opening  of the 
doors was sufficient to justify the detention of the 
accused for the purposes of coordination tests or a 
breath test. Opening  the doors did not make the 
police action arbitrary. Police may patrol to ensure 
peace and security, prevent the commission of crime 
and assist citizens. As part of their general powers 
while on routine patrol police can talk to people and 
ask them questions. The police had no specific crime 
in mind and even less evidence that a crime was 
being  prepared or was in progress. They simply 
wanted to check a stopped vehicle, which had 
attracted their attention: did the driver need help? 
were the passengers engaged in illegal activity? did 
the driver hesitate to put the vehicle in motion 
because they were impaired? Once near the vehicle 
the police could legally make observations, visual 
and olfactory. There was no detention, nor a search 
or seizure at this time. 
With the new observations made near the vehicle 
the accused could then be detained to investigate 
his ability to drive or have a vehicle under his 
control. The circumstances had changed: the police 
were acting  on more than a simple intuition or 
"hunch". The detention was not arbitrary. The 
olfactory and visual observations made at the 
driver's door was not an unlawful search. The officer 
then had reasonable grounds to intervene by asking 
the driver to submit to testing  (detention for 
investigative purposes).
Justice Dalphond, however, found that opening  the 
door did breach s. 8. The officer did not have 
grounds to believe that a crime was being 
committed - his partner did not tell him about the 
line of cocaine he saw on the approach to the 
vehicle. But shining  a flashlight would have put this 
in plain view anyways. The intrusion was unplanned 
and committed in good faith. Additionally, opening 
the door was imminent because the officer wanted 
to ask questions following  the detection of a strong 
odour of alcohol; it would have been inevitable that 
the accused would have been asked to leave the 
vehicle to give a test or submit to a breath sample. 
The vehicle’s interior would have been illuminated 
and the line of cocaine on the dashboard would 
have been discovered. 
The evidence obtained as a result of the illegal 
search needed to be distinguished from the other 
evidence. There was no reason to exclude the 
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evidence gathered before police opened the doors. 
This included evidence related to impairment. And 
the evidence obtained after the doors were opened 
was admissible under s. 24(2). Justice Dalphond 
allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial. 
Say Two (Evidence In)
Justice Gagnon found that s. 636 of Quebec’s HSC 
did not provide the police with lawful authority in 
this case to open the doors. Although s. 636 allows 
the police to immediately stop a vehicle and 
question the driver to verify sobriety, it does not 
always allow the police to search while exercising 
this authority. Opening  the passenger door without 
warning, followed by opening  the driver’s door, was 
not helpful for the exercise of powers conferred on 
the police under s. 636. The officer on the driver’s 
side, at first, knocked on the glass door. If opening 
the passenger door constituted an unreasonable 
search, then so did opening  the driver’s door. The 
officer did not say he opened the door to check the 
sobriety of the driver, but instead in response to his 
colleague. It was not reasonably necessary to 
conduct such a search in the exercise of powers 
conferred in ss. 636 and 636.1 of the HSC, at least at 
the preliminary stage of the sobriety check. 
The common law also did not allow the officers to 
search the vehicle without reasonable grounds for 
suspecting  the commission of a crime. The accused’s 
Charter rights had been violated. But Justice Gagnon 
agreed that the evidence should not be excluded. 
Although the intrusive conduct of the police was 
significant, the search did not violate the personal 
dignity of the accused and did not occur in the 
context of a high reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Furthermore, possessing  cocaine was a serious 
offence and the seized drugs were reliable evidence 
and vital to the prosecution. The circumstances 
surrounding  the acquisition of the evidence was not 
likely to bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Rather, it was its exclusion that would 
bring  disrepute. Justice Gagnon allowed the appeal 
and ordered a new trial.
Say Three (Evidence Out)
Justice Hesler concluded that the trial judge did not 
err. His findings were neither unreasonable nor 
based on a mistake or misinterpretation of the law. 
At trial, the Crown only argued that the police had 
acted under their general power of detention for 
investigative purposes under the common law, 
without any recourse to the powers conferred by s.
636 of the HSC. Here, the trial judge found there 
were no concrete or articulable reasons for the 
detention; it was exerted on the basis of a hunch. It 
was not the role of an appeal court to substitute its 
opinion for that of the trial judge; an appeal court 
must show deference to a lower court’s findings. In 
this case, the only evidence against the accused was 
collected in violation of his rights; it could not be 
collected independently, without the breach. In 
Justice Hesler’s opinion, the use of the illegally 
obtained evidence would affect trial fairness and 
bring  the administration of justice. He would have 
dismissed the appeal.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Conspiracy
“Conspiracy occurs when there is 
an agreement by two or more 
persons to commit a criminal 
offence. It is rarely proven by 
direct evidence of the agreement in question. 
However conspiracy, like any other crime, can be 
proven by direct and circumstantial evidence. In 
addition, it can also be proven by hearsay 
evidence. - New Brunswick Court of Appeal Justice 
Bell in R. v. Black, 2010 NBCA 36 at para. 40. 
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Note-able Quote
“One way to make sure crime doesn't pay would be to let the government run it.” - Ronald Reagan
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EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE DESPITE 
CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Simard, 2010 QCCA 1240 
Late in the evening  police drove past 
a church and saw two vehicles 
parked side by side in a remote 
corner; no other vehicles were 
parked nearby. The officer felt it was 
unusual to see vehicles parked there, but noted 
nothing  suspicious. The vehicles were parked legally, 
there was no offence under Quebec’s Highway 
Safety Code, and there was no 9-1-1 call. One of the 
vehicles had two men sitting  in it. The police 
decided to check it out and parked right in front of 
the vehicle occupied by the two men. They turned 
on their take down lights; very high intensity bulbs 
on the front of the patrol vehicle used to illuminate 
vehicle interiors. Behind the occupied vehicle were 
the steps to the front of the church, so the men could 
not back out and it was almost impossible for them 
to drive away; the vehicle was stopped and the 
occupants were not free to move. The police saw the 
two men make sudden movements, as if concealing 
something. The patrol vehicle was higher than the 
other car, which allowed police to see the two men. 
The driver was seen lean forward and the passenger 
was seen hiding  something  in the front pocket of his 
sweater. An officer took his flashlight, opened his 
door and proceeded at a rapid pace towards the 
accused (passenger), while his partner ran to the 
driver's side. The accused had his left hand over his 
pocket as if he was hiding  something. The officer 
ordered the accused to show him what he had in his 
pocket, but he refused. He was ordered out of the 
vehicle. While this was happening  the other officer 
leaned into the vehicle and smelled a strong  odour 
of bulk marihuana. 
The officer stepped back to allow the accused to 
open his door and he then immediately fled and ran 
to the back of the church. He was apprehended and 
was arrested for drug  trafficking. Inside the accused’s 
shirt pocket was a plastic “Ziploc” type bag  filled 
with 98 grams of marihuana. He was advised of his 
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. A 
search revealed a $5 bill, a key ring, and nine $20 
bills in his pockets. The driver was also arrested for 
drug  trafficking. He was searched and 27 grams of 
marihuana was found in his jean pocket. Key’s found 
on the accused activated the unlock function of the 
other vehicle parked nearby. Police opened the 
driver's side door to search for evidence of the 
accused’s identity and to see if the ignition was 
damaged. The center console was opened and a 
wallet containing  the accused’s identification and a 
roll of $20 bills fastened with a rubber band, 
totalling  $1,360, was found. A heavy bag  containing 
clear plastic bags of marihuana and three mobile 
telephones was also located. The vehicle was towed 
to the police station and a justice subsequently 
issued a telewarrant authorizing  the search of the 
vehicle. Police found 510 cartons of cigarettes in the 
car. The accused’s residence was also searched 
under warrant (he had told police he had marihuana 
plants at his home). He was charged with several 
tobacco and drug offences. 
The trial judge concluded that the detention was 
arbitrary and that the search was improper because 
it was incidental to that arbitrary detention. In 
addition, the detention was for investigation and the 
search had not been conducted in order to ensure 
the safety of the police officers. He found the 
accused had been psychologically detained before 
the officers detected the odour of marijuana and 
ordered the accused to show what he had in his 
pocket. The police acted as if they had reasonable 
grounds to believe that a criminal offense was 
committed or was about to be and accordingly took 
actions that detained the accused. The police had 
placed their patrol car in such a position that it 
prevented the vehicle  from moving. They turned on 
their high intensity lights to see inside and had the 
intention to search the vehicle visually; to see what 
was happening. But they had no reason to think, 
objectively or subjectively, that even an offense had 
been committed or was about to be committed. The 
police could have driven close to the vehicle, parked 
next to it, and with a flashlight, address the 
occupants, greet them, or ask them if they needed 
help. But this is not what the police did. Instead, 
they acted as if they had reasonable grounds to 
believe that a criminal offence was committed. Plus, 
even if there were grounds for an investigative 
detention, the search would have exceeded its 
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limited safety scope. The police did not search for 
their protection, but instead thought the accused had 
drugs in his possession. Finally, the trial judge held 
that the mere smell of marihuana did not provide 
reasonable grounds that there were drugs on the 
accused, especially in regard to a passenger in the 
car. The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter and the accused was acquitted of all 
charges. 
The Crown argued before the Quebec Court of 
Appeal that the trial judge erred in finding  a 
detention and that the evidence should not have 
been excluded. Justice Doyon, delivering  the Court’s 
unanimous judgment, agreed there was a Charter 
breach but ruled that the evidence was admissible. 
The Court of Appeal noted, as did the trial judge, 
that the two police officers were fully justified to go 
to the two vehicles to check them out. When a car is 
parked in public view the police can approach it to 
see, for example, if someone needed help, if the 
vehicle was abandoned, or if the situation called for 
other reasons to intervene. However, how the police 
park their patrol vehicle, use high-intensity 
headlamps, and conduct themselves can render the 
circumstances a detention. Here, there was more 
than just the use of high-intensity headlamps 
involved, but also the parking  maneuver performed 
by the police. The police car was positioned in such 
a manner that it prevented, for all practical 
purposes, the departure of the vehicle occupied by 
the accused.      
Without completely rejecting  safety grounds for 
explaining  the use of the high intensity headlamps, 
the trial judge concluded that the police intended to 
visually search the vehicle. In sum, the trial judge 
did not make a palpable and overriding  error in his 
evaluation of the evidence. It would be difficult to 
believe that two individuals could freely leave or, at 
the very least, it could be easily inferred that a 
reasonable person dazzled by high intensity police 
headlamps, prevented from moving  by the 
placement of a patrol vehicle, and facing  two police 
officers who moved quickly, would have concluded 
he had no choice but to comply with this implicit 
order and stay put. Following  the initial interaction, 
when the officer asked the accused what he had in 
his pocket and told him to leave the vehicle, the 
accused was controlled by police and detained. 
As for the grounds for detention, one officer testified 
he simply saw the accused reach into his pocket; he 
could not say whether there was an object in his 
hand or not. The other officer said he saw the driver 
gesturing  somewhat similar, but had not seen him 
hide anything. The trial judge opined that the police 
did not see what the men had done or even if they 
had something  in their hands. There was no clear 
link between the individual to be detained and a 
recent or ongoing  criminal offence and the smell of 
marijuana emanating  from the vehicle was not 
sufficient to order the accused, a passenger, out of 
the car and to empty the contents of his sweater 
pocket. 
Admission of Evidence
The Court of Appeal, however, found the trial judge 
erred in excluding  the evidence. The accused had 
not been conscripted against himself when the bag 
of marihuana was discovered in his sweater. This 
evidence existed without police intervention and it 
could not be said that the accused was forced to 
participate in its creation or discovery; it was simply 
seized during  his arrest. The police misconduct was 
serious, but it was not very serious. The impact of the 
Charter violations on the accused was also serious, 
but not extreme. The probative value of the evidence 
was significant and its exclusion would result in an 
acquittal. Weighing  all of the relevant factors and 
analyzing  them according  to the revised s. 24(2) 
approach, the evidence should have been admitted. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittals 
were set aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“No institution can possibly survive if it needs 
geniuses or supermen to manage it. It must be 
organized in such a way as to be able to get 
along under a leadership composed of 
average human beings.” - Peter Drucker 
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‘NO FREE-STANDING’ 
OBLIGATION ON POLICE TO 
PROVIDE GROUNDS TO LAWYER
R. v. McLean, 2010 BCCA 341
At about 8:30 pm  two vehicles were 
involved in an accident while 
travelling  in opposite directions.   The 
accused was driving  a pick-up truck 
with his twelve year old son in the 
front passenger seat. As he turned left he collided 
with an on-coming  pick-up truck killing  its driver. 
Neither the accused nor his son were injured. The 
accused had an odour of liquor on his breath, his 
face was flushed, his eyes were bloodshot and 
watery, and he seemed to be swaying  three to four 
inches from side to side. When asked if he had been 
consuming  alcohol the accused said “no”. When 
asked again about his consumption of alcohol that 
day he said that he had “three beers” and consumed 
his last drink at 1 p.m. After further conversation he 
said that his last drink was at 2 p.m.  The officer 
advised the accused that he was being  detained for 
impaired driving  causing  death and read him the 
breathalyzer demand and s. 10(b) Charter warning.
The accused was taken to the local police 
detachment and then directly to a telephone 
room. He spoke to his lawyer on the telephone and, 
after speaking  for about 20 minutes, motioned for 
the officer to come into the room to speak to his 
lawyer. The lawyer identified himself to the officer 
and asked him to provide his reasonable and 
probable grounds for making  the demand.  The 
officer told him that the grounds would be 
forwarded by way of disclosure. The lawyer told the 
officer that the law required him to provide his 
grounds, but the officer disagreed and gave the 
phone back to the accused, who then carried on the 
call in private for about 10 minutes and then hung 
up. The accused provided two samples of his breath, 
now three and a half hours after the collision, which 
analyzed as 140mg% and 130mg%.  
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the judge 
rejected the accused’s submission that his right to 
counsel had been breached when the officer failed 
to provide the grounds for the demand to the lawyer. 
The judge found that the accused had failed to 
establish that he was denied information that was 
necessary to giving  legal advice that counsel could 
not have obtained by other means such as asking  the 
accused. A toxicologist testified that the accused’s 
blood alcohol levels would have been between 
168mg% and 206mg% at the time of the accident, 
based on the readings.  However, based on the 
accused’s version of his drinking  pattern he would 
have been below the legal limit at the time of 
driving. The trial judge rejected the accused’s 
evidence and convicted him of impaired driving 
causing  death, over 80mg%, and dangerous driving 
causing death.  
The accused argued before the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, in part, that his right to retain and 
instruct counsel was violated when the investigating 
officer refused to disclose to his lawyer the grounds 
for making  the breath demand.  He wanted his 
convictions set aside and acquittals entered or, at the 
very least, a new trial ordered. 
Justice Ryan, authoring  the unanimous Court of 
Appeal judgment, disagreed with the accused. 
Neither the accused nor his lawyer testified on the 
voir dire to assert that the officer’s action in not 
stating  his grounds for the breathalyzer demand 
actually impaired the accused’s ability to obtain 
legal advice. There is no “free-standing  obligation on 
the part of the police to provide the grounds upon 
which the breath demand was made to counsel for 
the person to whom the demand has been made,” 
said the Court of Appeal. Here, the accused “failed 
to establish that his right to counsel was impaired by 
the action of the state,” explained Justice Ryan. 
“Regardless of whether [the lawyer] might have 
obtained the required information from his client or 
not, neither [the accused] nor [the lawyer] testified 
that [the lawyer’s] ability to provide legal advice to 
[the accused] was impaired by the actions of the 
police officer.” Thus, there was no basis in the 
evidence to find that the accused’s s. 10(b) rights 
were infringed. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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Editor’s Note: The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
did not say that the police never have to inform a 
lawyer of the grounds for the demand. There may be 
cases where the lawyer can’t get the necessary 
information from the accused and s. 10(b) may 
impose an obligation on the police to provide 
counsel with that information. In this case, however, 
there was no evidence presented to show that the 
lawyer’s ability to provide legal advice was 
inhibited; neither the lawyer nor the accused 
testified.
UNLAWFUL URINALYSIS SEIZURE 
ADMITTED
R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488
A vehicle driven by the accused, a 
former NHL hockey player, crossed 
four lanes of traffic on a busy four-
lane road and struck two oncoming 
vehicles, kill ing  his passenger 
(another former NHL hockey player). The driver of 
one of the other vehicles suffered significant, but not 
life threatening  injuries. It was dusk, the weather was 
clear, visibility was good, the road was dry, and 
traffic was steady but not heavy. Some observations 
were made that included a smell of alcohol in the 
vehicle and an odour of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath. His eyes were glassy and red and his pupils 
were dilated. A police officer accompanied the 
accused to the hospital in the back of the ambulance 
where he made two statements that indicated he had 
been drinking. While at the hospital a nurse drew a 
blood sample for medical purposes. Part of that 
blood sample was analyzed for blood alcohol 
content (BAC) at the hospital laboratory. The police 
later seized the results of that analysis (224mg
%).  The unused portion of the blood sample taken 
for medical reasons was later lawfully seized with a 
warrant by the police and analyzed (242mg%). The 
accused also urinated into a plastic container 
provided by the hospital staff. A police officer having 
custody of the accused at that time transferred some 
of the urine from the container into two vials, 
seizing  them.  They were subsequently analyzed 
(282mg%). Later, the accused urinated a second 
time and the officer again seized two vials of that 
urine and they too were analyzed (237mg%). 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice a 
toxicologist called by the Crown testified that the 
analysis of the blood and urine samples indicated a 
significant level of impairment at the time of the 
accident. He opined that a person with the accused’s 
physical characteristics and an average rate of 
alcohol elimination would have had to consume 
between 15 and 20 bottles of beer to produce the 
BAC levels indicated in the blood and urine analysis. 
The Crown conceded that the urine samples taken 
by police constituted a warrantless seizure and 
violated the accused’s rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter. But the results were admitted under s. 24(2). 
Although he characterized the urine samples as 
conscriptive evidence, the trial judge held the 
samples would inevitably have been obtained by 
non-conscriptive means (a search warrant).  The 
urinalysis results were reliable evidence and their 
admission would not adversely affect the truth-
seeking  function at trial.   The officer was entitled to 
be in the room with the accused, did nothing  to 
cause him to urinate, and had merely collected and 
preserved what he knew could be potentially 
relevant evidence. The intrusion upon the accused’s 
bodily integrity was “minimal”. Finally, the evidence 
was “highly probative” and important to the Crown’s 
case, the charges were serious and  excluding  the 
results of the urine samples would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The accused 
was convicted by a jury on five charges; impaired 
driving  causing  death, dangerous driving  causing 
death, impaired driving  causing  bodily harm, 
dangerous driving  causing  bodily harm, and over 
80mg% (which was stayed by the trial judge). The 
accused was sentenced to four years in jail and a 
five-year driving prohibition was imposed.
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
not excluding  the urinalysis results and that the 
accused could not be convicted of both the 
dangerous driving  and the impaired driving  charges 
arising  out of the same delict. He suggested that the 
dangerous driving charges should have been stayed. 
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Admissibility 
In determining  whether evidence is admissible 
under s.24(2) a court must consider:
• The seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct;
• The impact of the breach on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused; and
• Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
on its merits.
Justice Doherty, authoring  the Court of Appeal 
opinion, noted there was nothing  seized from the 
accused’s person nor from inside his body.  The 
officer was never asked to leave the room and his 
presence did not interfere with the accused’s 
medical treatment or his privacy.  The officer did 
nothing  to make the accused urinate or remove the 
urine from his body.  He merely stood by and 
allowed nature to take its course. Justice Doherty 
compared the seizure of the urine sample to the 
seizure of a discarded tissue by an arrestee in 
custody. It was because the accused was in custody 
that the officer was able to secure the bodily waste 
product after the accused had urinated but before 
the urine was discarded. Nonetheless, the accused 
still had a legitimate interest in preserving  the 
informational privacy embedded in his urine 
samples, including  information pertaining  to his 
blood alcohol level. 
Seriousness of the Charter- infringing state conduct. 
Under this branch of the s. 24(2) analysis a Court 
“looks both at what the police did and their attitude 
when they did it,” said Justice Doherty. “Respect for 
the justice system must suffer in the long 
term if courts routinely admit 
evidence gathered by state conduct 
that disregards individual rights.” The 
officer’s attitude showed little respect 
for the accused’s individual rights and 
rendered the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct more serious than it might have been. The 
officer, alert to the need to obtain evidence relating 
to the accused’s BAC, took a shortcut to get the urine 
samples.  He took advantage of the accused, who 
was under his control and in significant physical 
discomfort.  He had no authority to take the urine 
samples, but did so on two occasions.  He could 
have had the hospital secure the samples and 
obtained a warrant, which would likely have been 
granted; this would have respected the accused’s 
constitutional rights. But his conduct did not 
demonstrate the kind of disregard for individual 
rights that would be seen, in the long  term, as posing 
a significant threat to the public confidence in the 
due administration of criminal justice.  
Impact on accused’s Charter-protected interests. 
“The [accused’s] continued privacy interest in the 
information to be gleaned from his discarded bodily 
waste is well-removed from the essential core of 
personal privacy,” said the Court. “The 
[accused] gave up his waste product 
without any state compulsion or 
interference.” The officer could have 
segregated the sample and obtained a 
warrant for it, which would have 
yielded exactly the same evidence that was 
presented at trial.  
Society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits.  
The urinalysis results were reliable and potentially 
significant to the prosecution. “The exclusion of the 
urinalysis results would inevitably have hindered the 
search for the truth in this case,” said 
Justice Doherty.  “That cost is high 
given the relatively minor adverse 
effect on the [accused’s] Charter-
protected interests.” 
The evidence was properly admitted. 
Kienapple
In some circumstances, multiple convictions arising 
out of the same delict are not permitted. In this case, 
there were discrete offences.  There is a distinction 
between offences based on the manner in which a 
person drives and offences based on the impairment 
of one’s capacity to drive. As Justice Doherty stated:
An impaired driving  charge focuses on an 
accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or, 
delict = fault, crime, wrongfavours
exclusion
favours
admission
favours
admission
Volume 10 Issue 5 - September/October 2010
PAGE 11
more specifically, on whether that ability was 
impaired by the consumption of alcohol or some 
other drug. A dangerous driving charge focuses 
on the manner in which the accused drove and, 
in particular, whether it presented a danger to 
the public having  regard to the relevant 
circumstances identified in s. 249 of the 
Criminal Code.  The driver’s impairment may 
explain why he or she drove the vehicle in a 
dangerous manner, but impairment is not an 
element of the offence.  Both impaired driving 
and dangerous driving  address road safety, a 
pressing societal concern. They do so, however, 
by focussing on different dangers posed to road 
safety. Impaired driving looks to the driver’s 
ability to operate the vehicle, while dangerous 
driving  looks to the manner in which the driver 
actually operated the vehicle.  [para. 64]
Here, the accused’s conduct could not be described 
as the same delict. He committed the crime of 
impaired driving  when he got into his vehicle and 
drove it.  The dangerous driving  occurred about a 
half an hour later when he drove across four lanes of 
traffic into oncoming  vehicles. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DETENTION REQUIRES 
OBJECTIVE TEST
R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 211 
                                                                                                         
After stopping  a vehicle for a traffic 
violation, a police officer approached 
the passenger side of the accused’s 
vehicle and asked for a licence, 
registration, and insurance. He saw 
such things as fast food wrappers and a road map. 
After further investigation the officer warned the 
accused about his driving  and vehicle safety. Having 
a hunch, the officer wanted to continue speaking 
with the accused but he knew he did not have 
grounds to detain or search the vehicle, so he sought 
the accused’s voluntary cooperation. He told the 
accused that he was free to go. But as he was about 
to drive away, the officer asked the accused in a 
conversational tone whether he would be willing  to 
answer a few questions. The officer told the accused 
that he was not obliged to answer any questions but 
that he would appreciate it. 
The officer asked the accused where he had been 
and where he was going. The officer also placed his 
hands on the open car window. The accused was 
cooperative, stating  he was a real estate agent. They 
discussed the real estate market and recent news 
events. The officer asked whether the accused had 
any objections to a search of his vehicle. The 
accused told him to go ahead. The officer then said, 
“Okay. So you don’t object if I search your vehicle, 
understanding  it’s voluntary. You can stop me if you 
want, and if I find anything  like drugs, cocaine, and 
marijuana, you’d be charged.” The accused replied 
“It’s okay.” He was not advised of his right to 
counsel, nor expressly told that he could refuse to 
consent. The officer asked him to step out and pop 
the trunk. The accused got out of his vehicle and 
walked to the rear where he pushed a button to 
unlock the trunk. As he did so, he placed his hand 
on the trunk to prevent it from opening. A brief 
discussion about real estate occurred and the officer 
said, “Go ahead and pop the trunk if you want.” The 
accused opened the trunk and police found eight 
kilograms of marijuana, two kilograms of cocaine, 
and $10,000 cash in a suitcase. The accused was 
arrested, read a Charter warning, handcuffed, and 
transported to the police station. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, the 
judge found the accused had been arbitrarily 
detained. The accused testified he was not free to 
leave and felt compelled to answer the officer’s 
questions. The trial judge concluded that the 
accused was detained following  the completion of 
the motor vehicle transaction when the officer asked 
him if he would mind answering  a few questions. 
Even though the officer said the accused was free to 
go, he did not tell the accused he was neither under 
arrest nor detained. Plus the officer placed his hands 
on the open window; the accused could not have 
driven away in these circumstances without inviting 
some other charge. Although the officer had the right 
to stop the accused for the traffic violation, the 
officer did not have a reasonable suspicion or 
reasonable grounds for this further detention. The 
search was also unreasonable under s. 8 of the 
Charter. It was a warrantless search and the police 
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did not have reasonable grounds to effect a lawful 
arrest or to obtain a warrant. Nor could the search 
be justified on safety concerns or on the legitimate 
investigation of crime, since it was based solely on a 
hunch or experiential intuition. Additionally, the 
Crown failed to establish valid consent; the officer 
failed to expressly tell the accused that the vehicle 
could not be searched without his consent. Finally, 
the judge concluded that once the detention 
occurred the officer had a duty to inform the 
accused of the reason for his detention and of his 
right to counsel, thereby breaching  s. 10 of the 
Charter. Having  characterized the evidence as 
conscriptive, the trial judge excluded it under s. 
24(2) because its admission would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The accused 
was acquitted of possessing  drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s rulings to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, arguing  he erred by finding 
breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter. In the 
Crown’s view, the trial judge erroneously concluded 
that the accused was detained in the absence of 
objective evidence that he was subject to a demand 
or direction of a peace officer; thus s. 9 was not 
applicable nor was s. 10 engaged. As well, the 
Crown contended that a valid consent to search 
does not require the police to specifically advise the 
person to be searched that their consent is sought in 
relation to something  that the police “are not 
otherwise entitled to do”. Finally, the Crown 
submitted that the evidence was excluded because 
the trial judge applied the wrong test under s. 24(2).  
 
Detention
 
The Court of Appeal noted that a detention can 
occur psychologically, where a person has a 
reasonable perception of the suspension of their 
freedom of choice. The application or threat of 
application of physical restraint is not required. The 
question is whether police conduct would cause a 
reasonable person to conclude that they were not 
free to go and had to comply with the police 
direction or demand. Here, the Court of Appeal 
found the trial judge applied only a subjective test in 
determining  that the accused was detained. He 
failed to determine whether a reasonable person 
would perceive they had no option but to cooperate. 
Thus, the trial judge erred in law by failing  to use an 
objective test when considering  whether the accused 
was psychologically detained in all of the 
circumstances. In addition, “the trial judge erred in 
law in concluding  ... that the police say more than 
just telling  a person that he is free to go,” said the 
Court of Appeal. There is no mandatory script that 
needs be said to a person. Instead, it is important 
there be clear communication to the person that 
they are free to go. 
Search
 
A search conducted with consent can be valid. Part 
of proving  valid consent requires the Crown show, 
on a balance of probabilities, that it was voluntary; 
not the product of police oppression, coercion or 
other external conduct which would negate the 
freedom to choose whether or not to allow the 
police to pursue the course of conduct requested. 
Instead, the trial judge held the Crown needed to 
prove that the accused knew that the police could 
not conduct a search without his consent. But he 
didn’t consider whether the accused knew this even 
though (a) there was a request for permission to 
search the vehicle, (b) the accused was advised that 
he was free to go, (c) the accused was asked whether 
he had any objections to a search of the vehicle, and 
(d) the officer said the search was voluntary and the 
accused could stop him if he wanted to. These all 
met the criteria required for a valid consent. 
Additionally, the trial judge did not assess whether 
the accused withdrew his consent when he 
prevented the trunk lid from opening, and if so, 
whether he consented to the subsequent search. 
These questions needed to be answered. 
   
The Court of Appeal also ruled that the trial judge 
erred in classifying  the evidence as conscriptive in 
that the accused was compelled to participate in 
finding  the drugs and their admission would render 
the trial unfair. Since a new trial was ordered there 
was no need for a further analysis of the trial judge’s 
s. 24(2) ruling. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittals 
were set aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
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INFORMER PRIVILEGE REACHES 
BEYOND COURTROOM 
R. v. Barros, 2010 ABCA 116
 
Based partially on the information of 
a confidential informer the police 
obtained a warrant to search a home. 
As a result, they found 1.5 kgs. of 
methamphetamine, 1.5 kgs. of 
cocaine, three handguns, and a bulletproof vest. 
Drugs and weapons charges were laid against a man 
named Qureshi, who retained a lawyer to defend 
him. The lawyer, in turn, hired the accused, a retired 
police officer and now private investigator, to find 
out the identity of the informant. He arranged 
meetings with Qureshi’s associates and gave them a 
choice of providing  their phone numbers, submitting 
to a polygraph examination, or being  branded 
“uncooperative”.  He checked their cell phone 
records to see if any of them had called the lead 
investigator and compared the informer’s disclosed 
criminal record with the records of the Qureshi 
group members. He also tried to retain a polygraph 
operator to test the group, telling  each of them that 
he knew they were the informer. The accused was 
convinced he had identified the informer and 
arranged a meeting  with the lead investigator. At the 
meeting  the accused said he had identified the 
informer and that he would not pass that information 
on to Qureshi, inferring  that the charges should be 
dropped. 
He provided a warned statement to police saying  he 
discovered who the informant was and knew their 
identity with certainty. He also said he knew that if a 
police source was identified their  health and safety 
would be at risk. He knew from his prior police 
experience; the protection of a source’s identity was 
paramount and it was routine for the Crown and the 
police to stay charges if proceeding  would result in 
the exposure of the informant’s identity. The accused 
was subsequently charged with several offences, 
including  attempting  to obstruct justice by taking 
investigative steps to identify a confidential police 
source for the purpose of interfering  with criminal 
proceedings against Qureshi. As well, he was 
charged with extortion for attempting  to induce the 
lead investigator in taking  steps to stop criminal 
proceedings against Qureshi as well as for using 
threats to induce the cell phone numbers from 
Qureshi’s associates with intent to identify the 
source. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge concluded that there was no evidence for a 
verdict of guilty on the attempt obstruction of justice 
charge. She found that the accused was 
constitutionally entitled to take investigative steps to 
identify the informer and that his acts were not 
criminal in nature. He was also acquitted on the 
extortion charge; the Crown had not proven the 
objective of “ending criminal proceedings”.
 
The Crown then successfully appealed the directed 
verdict and the acquittals to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal. A majority found that attempts to identify a 
confidential informer and using  the subsequently 
discovered information was criminal in nature. In 
doing  so, Justice Slatter first outlined the basic rules 
and principles of police informers and the justice 
system. 
Police informers
 
The identity of police informers and information 
which might assist in identifying  them, is privileged 
and the privilege overrides the general duty of the 
Crown to disclose all relevant information to an 
accused (subject to the “innocence at stake” 
exception). The rule of informer privilege serves a 
dual purpose; (1) to protect the informer, and (2) to 
encourage others to cooperate with the police. 
Neither the police nor the courts can waive informer 
privilege; the privilege belongs to the Crown and 
can only be waived with the informer’s consent. The 
rule is also extremely broad. It applies:
• to the identity of every informer; whether the 
informer is present or not and even where the 
informer is a witness;
• to both documentary evidence and oral 
testimony;
• in criminal and civil trials;
• to the police, Crown, lawyers and judges in 
their duty to keep an informer’s identity 
confidential;
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• to any information which might tend to identify 
an informer; it is not limited simply to the 
informer's name.
 
Although this privilege allowed the Crown to keep 
the information secret, the accused argued that it 
didn’t prevent others from trying  to discover the 
information independently. Further, he submitted 
that the privilege only applied in the courtroom; it 
did not prevent the collection of information about 
the informer outside the courtroom. Finally, he 
suggested that there was no rule that prevented him 
from discovering  the informant’s identity as part of 
making full answer and defence. 
The majority rejected an independent right to 
determine an informer's identity, both in the sense 
that there was no law prohibiting  such investigations 
(meaning  anything  not prohibited was permitted) or 
in the sense that the information could be obtained 
as part of the positive right to make full answer and 
defence. Even if the “innocence at stake” exception 
is engaged, the Crown decides whether to produce 
the information or stay the charges. “Since the 
Crown is not under any duty to disclose the name of 
the informer, unless the ‘innocence at stake’ 
exception is in play, it follows that there is no 
general claim right on the part of the accused to 
have it,” said Justice Slatter. “There is no principle of 
fundamental justice entitling  the accused to know 
the identity of the informer, because even when 
‘innocence at stake’ may require disclosure, the 
Crown has the option of discontinuing  the 
prosecution.” The accused cannot even ask a witness 
if they are the informer. Thus, it would be 
inconsistent that the most direct form of inquiry is 
prohibited, but other collateral inquiries are not only 
permitted, but are a right of the accused. There is no 
general rule that privileged information need not be 
disclosed, but that strangers are entitled to obtain it 
by any surreptitious means they can devise. As well, 
the majority found that any right to uncover 
privileged information by independent inquiries was 
inconsistent with the objectives of protecting 
informers and encouraging  others to cooperate with 
the police. “Both the existing  informer and the 
potential informer will regard it as equally 
dangerous regardless of whether their identity is 
disclosed by the police, or discovered independently 
by the accused,” said Justice Slatter. “In either case, 
their safety is jeopardized, and the willingness of 
citizens to come forward with important information 
is compromised.” This important public policy 
depends on secrecy, which would be lost if an 
accused had a private right to expose informers. 
Thus, an accused person had neither a positive or 
claim right to identify a confidential informer.
 
The majority also rejected the suggestion that 
informer privilege only existed inside a courtroom as 
part of court procedure and was not binding  on 
anyone outside the courtroom: 
Any such rule would make the informer privilege 
meaningless and ritualistic. It is artificial to 
suggest that information that cannot be spoken 
of in the courtroom, but can be freely discussed 
anywhere else, is “secret”. Further, the whole 
point of the privilege is to protect the informer. 
The informer is not at risk of anything happening 
to him inside the courtroom; the risk lies entirely 
outside the courtroom. The whole point of the 
privilege is to prevent the informer’s identity 
from getting into the hands of members of the 
community who would seek retribution against 
the informer. Apart altogether from the lack of 
any authority on the point, this position is 
illogical.
The informer privilege is commonly referred to 
as a “privilege”. Rules of privilege are generally 
rules of evidence, and so generally relate to an 
exception to the normal rules compelling 
production of relevant evidence, or to the 
inadmissibil i ty of evidence in judicial 
proceedings. The informer privilege has both of 
those characteristics.  However, ... the informer 
privilege is more that just a rule of evidence, and 
has a wider societal reach relating to the 
effective investigation of crime.  It combines 
evidentiary implications with a general 
requirement of secrecy, both in and outside 
judicial proceedings. As such it could more 
properly be referred to as a principle of 
“immunity” or “secrecy”. 
 
The informer privilege is not like an exclusionary 
rule of evidence. Excluded evidence, such as 
hearsay evidence or character evidence, is kept 
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from the trier of fact, but it is often repeated and 
relied on in day-to-day life. Such evidence is 
inadmissible, but it is neither privileged nor 
secret. The point of the informer privilege rule is 
not to keep the information from the trier of fact, 
but to keep it from society at 
large. The mischief is not that the 
trier of fact might rely on 
unreliable evidence, but rather 
that antisocial members of society 
might seek retribution against the 
informer. It defeats the whole 
point to say that the privilege is 
respected so long as i t is 
maintained within the courtroom, 
even if the privileged information 
is widely distributed outside the 
courtroom.  [references omitted, 
paras. 29-31]
 
Informer privilege is binding  on all persons, both 
inside and outside the courtroom, and the privilege, 
secrecy, or immunity that attaches to the informant 
does not end at the courthouse door. Nor did the 
right to make full answer and defence extend so far 
as to allow the accused to try and ascertain the 
identity of the informer.
 
The Charges: Obstruction & Extortion
As for the attempting  to obstruct justice charge, the 
majority concluded that the methods used by the 
accused to identify the informer were inherently 
malevolent and oppressive and inclined to obstruct 
justice. 
 
Discouraging the reporting  of crimes generally, 
and interfering with trials, by intimidating  or 
discouraging witnesses can be an obstruction of 
justice. Since one of the purposes of the informer 
privilege is to encourage other informers to 
report crime, undermining the privilege by 
attempting  to identify an informer prima facie 
amounts to obstruction, absent a reasonable 
justification or excuse. It does so in two ways: it 
necessarily intimidates the actual informer, and 
it discourages potential informers and witnesses. 
The “investigative steps” themselves could, as 
alleged, amount to an attempt to obstruct justice. 
[references omitted, para. 68]
 
And further:
Trying to disrupt a prosecution by corrupt means 
is obstruction. Wilfully suggesting  that the 
identity of an informer might inevitably come 
out if a prosecution was pursued, 
knowing the risk this would have 
on the safety of the informer, 
knowing of the privilege that 
attaches to that information, and 
knowing the effect it might have 
on other potential informers 
coming  forward, is a corrupt 
means within this rule. Wilfully 
suggesting  that the information 
might be released unless a 
p r o s e c u t i o n i s h a l t e d i s 
obstruction. The evidence here 
could support an inference that 
the [accused’s] comments to [the lead 
investigator] were wilful and calculated to 
convey such suggestions, and could thus 
establish the mens rea required for obstruction. 
[references omitted, para. 70]
Since the accused’s overall course of conduct could 
arguably amount to an obstruction of justice the 
directed verdict was in error and a trial was 
required. As for the extortion charge related to 
inducing  an end to proceedings, the purpose of the 
meeting  was to have the charges dropped or the 
informer’s name might become public and, as a 
result, the informer might be harmed by third parties 
(members of Qureshi’s group). Proof of an extortion 
does not require that the threat be overt and clumsy; 
subtle threats and menaces are enough. The indirect 
threat in this case was more than sufficient to 
constitute a threat or menace in law. The accused 
knew that naming  the informer would endanger 
their safety; any attempt at threatening  to reveal it if 
he did not get his way could amount to extortion. 
Plus, there was nothing  in the evidence to suggest a 
“reasonable justification or excuse” for what the 
accused did. Thus, the trial judge’s reasons for 
acquitting  the accused were in error and a new trial 
was ordered on this count as well. A new trial was 
also ordered on the extortion to obtain the cell 
phone numbers. To prove extortion, the Crown did 
not have to prove that the threats were actually 
successful or actually induced the recipient to 
provide the telephone numbers;  it only required an 
“Since one of the purposes 
of the informer privilege is 
to encourage other 
informers to report crime, 
undermining the privilege by 
attempting to identify an 
informer prima facie 
amounts to obstruction...”  
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“attempt” to accomplish the desired end. Asking  for 
the telephone records was not the threat; it was that 
the informer’s information would be released. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
 
A Second Opinion
Justice Berger, in dissent, would have dismissed the 
appeal. In his view, informer privilege protects the 
informant’s identity from being  revealed or 
information that would tend to disclose their 
identity, whether in public or in court. This protects 
the informer from retribution and encourages 
cooperation with the criminal justice system. But it 
does not preclude a legitimate investigation to 
ascertain the identity of an informer, perhaps to 
determine whether the alleged informer is an agent 
of the state, a material witness, or a fictional source 
fabricated for illegal purposes. Just because a court, 
Crown, or the police have a duty not to furnish 
information that may disclose the identity of the 
informer, no such duty is imposed upon an accused 
or his legal representative. Justice Berger also 
rejected the theory that an attempt to ascertain an 
informer’s identity necessarily equates with an intent 
to reveal the identity. He concluded the trial judge 
did not err in concluding  that identifying  a police 
informant did not in itself constitute an obstruction 
of justice and the Crown failed to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused’s purpose was to 
interfere with criminal proceedings. He also agreed 
with the acquittals on the extortion charges. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
PROOF OF ‘EXPLOSIVE 
SUBSTANCE’ DOES NOT 
REQUIRE EXPLOSION
R. v. K.D.S.A., 2010 NBCA 24
The accused, a grade nine student, 
met with his guidance counselor in a 
school office. He showed the 
guidance counselor a number of 
instructional YouTube videos on  the 
subject of constructing  a sparkler bomb. During  a 
subsequent meeting  he showed the guidance 
counselor a device he had constructed. The device 
was turned over to police. It was made of a glass 
spice bottle covered in gun tape with a “single 
sparkler as a fuse protruding  from the top”. It was 
removed and disarmed at a remote location by a 
member of the Explosive Disposal Unit. Samples of 
debris from the disrupted device were forwarded for 
chemical analysis to a forensic laboratory. The 
samples were analyzed and an expert in the 
examination, analysis and identification of 
explosives found they contained nitrocellulose, 
polyvinylchloride, copper, iron, barium, ammonium, 
sodium, potassium, chloride, calcium, nitrate, 
sulfate, and aluminum ions. In the expert’s opinion 
some of the chemicals commonly appeared in 
pyrotechnic compositions and if confined could 
explode. Another expert, qualified in the field of 
identification and construction of improvised 
explosive devices, built two reproductions of the 
device and conducted trials to determine if the 
reproductions would explode. Twice the devices did 
not ignite, while on a third modified trial a very large 
fire, but no explosion, occurred.  
At his trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was found not guilty of possessing  an 
explosive substance. Although the device was 
described as an “improvised explosive device”, the 
trial judge held that the Crown needed to prove that 
the device was in fact an improvised explosive 
device. In his view, there must be an explosion. 
Since the experts could not get their replicated 
device to explode the trial judge was not satisfied 
that the device was an improvised explosive device. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Murder Of A Police Officer
“Apart from treason in wartime, 
killing police officers is probably 
the most serious crime in 
Canada.” - Alberta Court of 
Appeal Justice Cote in R. v. Hennessey, 2010 ALCA 274 
at para. 16. 
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The Crown then appealed the accused’s acquittal, 
arguing  that the trial judge erred in law. In its view, 
the trial judge adopted and applied the wrong 
definition of the term “explosive substance” when he 
found there must be an explosion. The New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal agreed. 
Section 82(1) of the Criminal Code creates an 
indictable offence, punishable by a term of 
imprisonment up to five years, for a person to make 
or have in their possession or under their  care or 
control any explosive substance, subject to lawful 
excuse. Section 2 defines an “explosive substance” 
as including  (a) anything  intended to be used to 
make an explosive substance, (b) anything, or any 
part thereof, used or intended to be used, or adapted 
to cause, or to aid in causing  an explosion in or with 
an explosive substance, and (c) an incendiary 
grenade, fire bomb, molotov cocktail or other similar 
incendiary substance or device and a delaying 
mechanism or other thing  intended for use in 
connection with such a substance or device. 
“[Section] 2 does include ‘anything  or any part 
thereof, used or intended to be used, or adapted to 
cause, or to aid in causing  an explosion in or with 
an explosive substance’” said Justice Quigg. 
“Furthermore, ... although the replicated devices did 
not explode, they were capable of starting  a fire and 
thus, were incendiary devices under s. 2.” The 
device did fit into the s.  2 definition of explosive 
substance and thus s. 82(1). The Court of Appeal 
found “[n]owhere in the s. 2 definition does the 
Criminal Code require there to be an explosion. 
Whether or not the device functions properly should 
be of no consequence as to whether it meets the 
legal definition of ‘explosive substance’.” Since the 
trial judge based his decision on the fact that the 
replicated devices failed to explode he would not 
necessarily have reached the same conclusion that 
the device was not an “explosive substance” as 
defined by the Criminal Code. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEARCH WARRANT INVALID, 
BUT EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Wong, 2010 BCCA 160
After receiving  a tip from an unknown 
informant, police investigated and 
conducted surveillance, resulting  in 
the accused’s home becoming  the 
target of a search warrant. The affiant 
believed a methamphetamine lab was at the 
residential premises occupied by the accused. 
Because there were previous raids at two other 
houses preceding  this search warrant, the police felt 
there was some urgency and sought a telewarrant. 
However, the ITO contained a significant error; it 
claimed that the accused had been arrested at a 
residence where a meth lab had been found 
before. This was not true. The officer later explained 
at trial that he must have mixed up his papers at the 
time he was applying  for a warrant to search a 
different house.  As well, the ITO also contained 
another deficiency relating  to a vehicle. After the 
telewarrant was issued the police searched the 
premises and found the accused inside. Documents 
in the house suggested the accused had been 
residing  there for some time, and finished and 
unfinished methamphetamine was found, as were 
scales and a book detailing  how to manufacture 
methamphetamine. The accused was charged with 
producing  and possessing  methamphetamine for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge concluded the residence contained “a passive 
methamphetamine lab”.  However, when the judge 
excised the untrue statements from the ITO there 
were insufficient grounds remaining  upon which a 
proper basis remained for the issuance of the search 
warrant. The search of the residence therefore 
became warrantless. This was a s. 8 Charter 
violation, but the judge admitted the evidence under 
s. 24(2). The evidence was non-conscriptive real 
evidence which would not render the trial 
unfair. The breach did not arise from bad faith, but 
was inadvertent or careless. He found the erroneous 
statement about the accused being  found at the 
methamphetamine lab was an honest mistake as 
opposed to a deliberate disregard for the accused’s 
www.10-8.ca
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Charter rights. The exclusion of the real evidence 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  The judge acquitted the accused on the 
production charge (since the meth lab was not 
active) but found him guilty of possessing 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal, challenging  the trial judge’s ruling  in 
admitting  the evidence. However, even using  the 
modified framework for the s. 24(2) analysis, the 
Court of Appeal found the evidence still admissible. 
1. the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct (admission may send the message the 
just ice system condones serious s tate 
misconduct). The judge concluded there was no 
bad faith, improper motive, or malice; police 
acted in good faith and the breach arose from 
inadvertence or carelessness.  The police 
proceeded “with a sense of urgency” because 
there may have been reason for the occupants 
of the house to destroy evidence.   Although this 
did not justify the warrantless search, it was 
relevant in considering  the conduct of the 
police. In addition, the search was not random 
or based merely on a good guess.
2. the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused  (admission 
may send the message that individual rights 
count for little). The trial judge found the Charter 
breach was more than technical. It was a search 
of a dwelling; a serious invasion of privacy. 
3. society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits.  The trial judge considered 
that “the production of methamphetamine and 
possession of it for the purpose of trafficking, are 
very serious offences” and the presence of a 
methamphetamine laboratory in a residential 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d “ p o s e s a n e x t r e m e 
hazard”.  Methamphetamine production is a 
community scourge and the exclusion of the 
evidence would end the prosecution.  
The judge then balanced the integrity of the justice 
system, which should not sanction warrantless 
searches, particularly those involving  the search of a 
private home, against “the interests of society in an 
investigatory process which has been used to ferret 
out serious crime in a residential neighbourhood”. 
The trial judge considered all of the relevant 
circumstances in determining  whether the evidence 
should be excluded or admitted pursuant to s. 24(2) 
of the Charter. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
STAY RESULTS FROM 
‘HORRENDOUS’ POLICE 
BRUTALITY
R. v. Tran, 2010 ONCA 471
Following  several violent residential 
robberies, the accused Tran, together 
with several others, was charged 
with a number of offences. In each 
home invasion the privacy and 
security of the dwellings were shattered, victims 
were violated, both physically and psychologically, 
and property was taken. On his lawyer’s advice Tran 
turned himself in to police. He received a severe 
beating  at the hands of two police officers resulting 
in a broken jaw in two places and permanent injury; 
he now bites himself when he eats, has a sore jaw 
and loose teeth, and suffers from migraines. The 
police officers attempted to cover up their 
behaviour. Despite this, the Crown permitted the 
officers to remain in court to assist with the 
prosecution until the trial judge ordered otherwise. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused testified that he was shoved and punched 
and put him in an interview room that was not 
equipped with a video camera. Police demanded a 
statement. He continued to invoke his right to 
silence and was punched in the ribs and the jaw; his 
mouth bled profusely. He still would not talk and 
officers tried to conceal their misconduct by 
cleaning  up the blood in the interview room. Tran 
said they also put him in front of a video camera and 
tried to get him to say that he had hit his chin on the 
table; but they were unsuccessful. The officers tried 
to explain the injuries to other officers by saying  that 
Tran was wiggling  his tooth and trying  to “play it 
up”, and that he had been violent and uncooperative 
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with police. The officers, on the other hand, denied 
the assault; claiming  they left Tran alone in the 
interview room to later find him on the floor, still 
handcuffed, with blood coming  from his lower lip. 
He said he fell and the officers put him on videotape 
to tell the truth about the source of his injuries.  A 
medical expert testified that the injuries Tran suffered 
were consistent with a blow to the jaw; not with a 
fall.  The trial judge disbelieved the officers and 
found the accused had been brutally assaulted and 
his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 12 had been 
breached. But the judge refused to stay the 
proceedings against Tran as a result of the police 
brutality; the breach did not affect the evidence 
against him, the charges were serious, and a stay 
was not appropriate. The accused was convicted of 
conspiracy to commit robbery. The judge, however, 
found that the appropriate and just remedy was to 
reduce the sentence he would otherwise receive by 
half. After this reduction Tran was sentenced to 14 
months imprisonment plus three years probation. 
Tran appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in refusing 
his application to stay the prosecution against him as 
a result of police actions. In his view, because of the 
circumstances surrounding  the breach and its 
seriousness the continued prosecution offended the 
fundamental principles of justice that underlie the 
community’s sense of fair play and decency and 
therefore the only appropriate response was a stay of 
proceedings.  
The Court of Appeal agreed. “Section 7 provides 
citizens with a right to be secure against arbitrary 
force, especially physical violence, by state actors,” 
said Justice Epstein for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal. ”Section 12 deals with the degree to which 
the state may treat or punish an individual.” 
Sections 24(1) and (2) provide jurisdiction to remedy 
a Charter breach.   In this case, the trial judge had 
two options – (1) reduce the sentence (either by 
application of the remedial provision of the Charter 
or through the sentencing  provisions of the Criminal 
Code) or (2) stay the proceedings.  Justice Epstein 
described the inherent jurisdiction of a court to stay 
proceedings as a measure of control over the 
judicial process as follows:
The common law abuse of process doctrine is 
designed to protect the fundamental principles 
of justice that underlie the community’s sense of 
fair play and decency.  [T]he judiciary should 
resort to a stay when necessary to communicate 
that it will not condone state conduct that 
transcends what our society perceives as 
acceptable. The objective of a stay as a remedy 
is to maintain public confidence in both the 
legal and the judicial process. [references 
omitted, para. 83]
The Court found this was one of those “clearest of 
cases” where a stay should have been granted and 
the prosecution halted. The nature and degree of the 
state misconduct demanded a remedy that went 
beyond a sentence adjustment.  “This case involved 
horrendous police misconduct that breached Tran’s 
ss. 7 and 12 Charter rights, jeopardized the 
perception of trial fairness and brought the integrity 
of law enforcement into disrepute,” said the Court. 
Plus, there was no evidence of any effective 
response to the police brutality. SIU had investigated 
the matter, but concluded the file, finding  there were 
no reasonable grounds to believe that the officer had 
committed any criminal offence and, despite the 
trial judge’s findings of serious police brutality, no 
further action was taken against the officers. So even 
though the evidence against Tran was unaffected by 
the brutality and the charges were serious, a stay 
could be granted because the abuse was more than 
sufficiently serious to warrant a stay. “It is essential 
for the court to distance itself from this kind of state 
misconduct – an unwarranted, grave assault causing 
bodily harm, delayed medical attention, a cover up 
that included perjury, a prosecutorial response that 
affected the perception of trial fairness and no 
effective response,” said Justice Epstein.  “Not to do 
so would be to leave the impression that it tacitly 
approves of it. The granting  of a stay of proceedings 
affirms the fundamental values of our society and 
ensures that the rights under the Charter are not, in 
substance, meaningless.” Tran’s appeal was allowed 
and a stay of proceedings was entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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POLICE MUST RESPECT 
AUTHORIZATION: LISTENING TO 
INTERCEPTED CALLS 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Martin, 2010 NBCA 41
As part of an investigation into the 
unlawful sale of tobacco, police 
obtained authorizations to intercept 
private communications of a known 
party. The authorization contained a 
basket clause, which also allowed the police to 
intercept communications of other individuals. But 
there was also a clause to guard against the 
interception of privileged communications between 
a solicitor and their client. This clause prohibited the 
interception of communications at the office or 
residence of a solicitor, and also required the police 
to stop listening  to a communication when they 
reasonably believed that a solicitor was a party to a 
communication. If a call was intercepted while on 
automatic monitoring, the monitor or police officer/
investigator who subsequently reviewed the call was 
to stop listening  to it as soon as they reasonably 
believed that a solicitor was a party to it. Any 
communication with the solicitor that was recorded 
was to be sealed and only accessed upon 
authorization of a court. 
The police subsequently determined they had 
sufficient grounds to arrest the known party. They 
set up surveillance and arrested him. He was 
transported to a police station where he exercised 
his s. 10(b) Charter  right to consult with a lawyer. 
Police continued to monitor the telephone. The 
monitor noted the line was active and started 
listening  to the call. A man was speaking  to the 
known party’s wife and the monitor heard him tell 
the wife that her husband was detained and to call 
another person to come to the home and remove 
some incriminating  evidence. Nothing  in the 
conversation led the monitor to believe a solicitor 
was making  that call. The monitor called the lead 
investigator and they both listened to a recording  of 
the intercepted call. At the beginning  of the call the 
male caller identified himself as a lawyer. The 
monitor then believed that she was required to 
comply with the authorization and cease listening  to 
the recording. But the investigator instructed her to 
play back the entire conversation. As a result police 
attended the known party’s residence, arrested his 
wife and the accused (a lawyer), and searched the 
house, finding  tobacco residue on the toilet seat and 
small quantities of tobacco in the bathroom. The 
accused was charged under s. 139(2) of the Criminal 
Code with attempting  to obstruct justice by 
counselling someone to dispose of evidence. 
In the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused applied to have the evidence of the 
intercepted conversation between the known party’s 
wife and himself excluded because the police 
breached his s. 8 Charter rights. He submitted, in 
part, that the surreptitious electronic interception of 
his conversation constituted an unreasonable search 
or seizure because police did not comply with the 
authorization’s conditions that prevented them from 
listening  to a conversation involving  a lawyer. As a 
resul t he contended that the intercepted 
communication should be excluded under s. 24(2) 
of the Charter because its admission into evidence 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The trial judge agreed, finding  that both 
the monitor and the lead investigator should have 
known from the outset that the conversation 
involved a lawyer. He reasoned that only a lawyer 
could have made the call to the known party’s wife 
and police should have realized this because they 
knew the known party was in custody and they 
should have expected he would exercise his right to 
counsel. The intercepted communication was 
excluded from evidence at trial. Although the 
evidence would not affect trial fairness, the lead 
investigator usurped the judicial function and 
committed a “most serious violation”. The accused 
was acquitted.
The Crown appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal arguing, among  other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in finding  a s. 8  Charter violation and in 
deciding  to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Justice Richard, writing  the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal, agreed that the actions of the monitor and 
the investigator failed to respect the provisions of the 
authorization. As soon as the police realized a 
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solicitor was involved in the communication they 
were required to stop listening. However, the Court 
of Appeal did not agree that the police should have 
realized it was a solicitor on the phone from the 
outset of the call. With the first part of the 
intercepted conversation not listened to, it was mere 
conjecture that the person calling  was a solicitor and 
there was nothing  in the remaining  conversation that 
would lead a reasonable person to believe a solicitor 
was making  that call. When the monitor called the 
lead investigator and advised him of what she had 
heard, the lead investigator had no reason to believe 
a solicitor was involved. Rather, the monitor and the 
investigator only became aware a solicitor was 
involved when the monitor started to play the entire 
conversation for the investigator. At this point, 
however, Justice Richard held that both the monitor 
and the investigator failed to comply with the 
provisions of the authorization requiring  them to 
immediately cease listening. The communication 
could still be recorded, but it had to be sealed and 
could not be accessed without authorization from a 
court. “The Authorization is an order of the Court 
and it did not leave room for any misinterpretation: 
as soon as a monitor or police officer/investigator 
reasonably believes that a solicitor is a party to a 
communication, the monitor or police officer/
investigator must cease listening,” said Justice 
Richard. “This clause of the Authorization applied to 
both [the monitor] and to [the investigator] and each 
was individually expected to respect it.” 
The interception of communications constituted a 
search and seizure; not complying  with the terms of 
the authorization risked it becoming  unreasonable. 
Here, the interception and recording  of the call was 
not unreasonable because the interception and 
recording  were authorized. The monitor was only 
required to stop listening  if she reasonably believed 
a lawyer was involved. But by the time she realized 
that it was, the communication had already been 
properly intercepted and recorded. However, the 
Court of Appeal found the continued playback after 
it was learned a solicitor was involved constituted a 
separate search, which was not authorized and was 
unreasonable. Once it was learned a lawyer was 
involved there was no authority for police to further 
listen to any part of the communication. By doing  so 
there was an unlawful search that was neither 
judicially or otherwise authorized by law. The 
accused’s s. 8 Charter rights were breached.
Exclusion of Evidence
Seriousness of the Charter-infringing State Conduct
Although what the police did would generally be 
considered a serious violation, there were 
extenuating  circumstances. The investigator already 
knew the gist of the communication as related by 
the monitor before listening  to it. Plus there was a 
sense of urgency. The police needed to  prevent the 
disappearance of evidence; there was information 
that evidence could be removed from the home 
before a search warrant was executed. Further, there 
was nothing  to suggest a pattern of police 
overlooking  the terms of authorizations. So the 
police conduct was serious, but not egregious. 
Impact on the Accused’s Charter-Protected Interests
 
Although the privacy interest in one’s telephone calls 
is high, it is not absolute and lawful interceptions 
can be authorized. Here, the conversation was 
lawfully intercepted and lawfully monitored until it 
was learned a solicitor was involved on play back. 
Justice Richard stated:
One might ask what privacy interest there is in a 
conversation that has already been intercepted 
and recorded by the police. In my view, there 
remains a privacy interest, but it may not be very 
high. The interest is that the interception will be 
processed according to the terms of the 
Authorization. In this case, it meant being sealed 
and submitted to a Court before it could be 
released to the investigators. The privacy interest 
is not very high because the conversation has 
already been heard and if, as in this case, it is 
not protected by privilege, it will likely be 
unsealed upon the proper application to the 
Court. I acknowledge that the facts of this case 
are rather unique. If, for example, [the monitor] 
had reasonably believed from the outset a 
lawyer was involved in the communication and 
had nonetheless listened to the conversation and 
related it to [the investigator], the situation 
would be quite different.  
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Society’s Interest in an Adjudication on the Merits
 
The evidence was highly relevant and reliable. “The 
intercepted communication speaks for itself,” said 
the Court. “Its importance to the prosecution is also 
evident. Without the interception, the prosecution’s 
case collapses” and society’s interest in an 
adjudication on its merits would be compromised.
In balancing  the above three factors, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that the admission of the 
evidence would not bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the accused’s acquittal was set aside, and a 
new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
INMATE HAS PRIVACY INTEREST 
IN RECORDED CALLS 
R. v. Siniscalchi, 2010 BCCA 354
Following  a police investigation of 
several robberies, the accused was 
arrested and held in a Pre-Trial 
centre. At the facility there was a 
telephone system available for 
inmates to use and calls were automatically 
recorded. The accused made 21 phone calls on the 
Inmate Call Control System (ICCS) over a nine day 
period; seven calls were with his wife and the others 
to family members (eg. mother, father, cousin, etc.). 
Prison authorities did not listen to these calls as part 
of their duties. Acting  on a tip from a confidential 
informant that the accused had confessed 
involvement in several robberies during  one of his 
telephone calls, police confirmed with an official at 
the Pre-Trial Centre that he had made a number of 
phone calls while in custody, but the official refused 
to provide further information unless a production 
order was obtained. The police obtained a 
production order for copies of the recordings. 
Although the conversations were typically of a 
personal nature and did not contain any confession 
of guilt, they did include numerous discussions of 
the robberies. 
At trial on two counts of robbery in British Columbia 
Provincial Court transcripts of the recorded calls 
were entered into evidence. The trial judge found 
the accused had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the telephone calls and therefore there 
was no infringement of s. 8  of the Charter when the 
recordings were obtained by the police. The Crown 
said that the transcripts could be used to infer guilt 
because the statements were consistent with the 
accused having  robbed the victims and there was no 
denial of his involvement in contexts where a denial 
would be expected. The trial judge did not, however, 
use the transcripts for the purposes suggested by 
Crown. Instead, he used the transcripts only in 
assessing  the accused’s credibility and in rejecting 
his alibi evidence. The accused was convicted.
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting, among  other grounds, 
that the police breached his s. 8 Charter rights when 
they obtained the recordings and they should have 
been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Before rendering  its decision, Justice Huddart, 
speaking  for the Court of Appeal, first summarized 
the principles surrounding s. 8 of the Charter:
1. A claim for relief under s. 24(2) can only be made 
by the person whose Charter rights have been 
infringed.  
2. Like all Charter rights, s.  8 is a personal right.  It 
protects people and not places.  
3. The right to challenge the legality of a search 
depends upon the accused establishing  that his 
personal rights to privacy have been violated.
4. As a general rule, two distinct inquiries must be 
made in relation to s.  8.  First, has the accused a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Second, if he 
has such an expectation, was the search by the 
police conducted reasonably.  
5. A reasonable expectation of privacy is to be 
determined on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances.  
6. The factors to be considered in assessing the 
totality of the circumstances may include, but are 
not restricted to, the following:
(i) presence at the time of the search;
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(ii) possession or control of the property or place 
searched;
(iii) ownership of the property or place;
(iv) historical use of the property or item;
(v) the ability to regulate access, including the 
right to admit or exclude others from the 
place;
(vi) the existence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy; and
(vii) the objective reasonableness of the 
expectation.
7. If an accused person establishes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the inquiry must proceed 
to the second stage to determine whether the 
search was conducted in a reasonable manner. 
[references omitted, para. 65]
In this case Justice Huddart found that the accused 
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Although the accused was not present when the 
recordings were obtained by the police, did not 
possess or own the physical media on which the 
conversations were recorded or the place where 
they were kept, and did not have a historical right to 
use or the ability to regulate access to them, he had 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the telephone 
calls themselves which was objectively reasonable. 
Even though the privacy expectations 
that a person has while in prison are 
substantially diminished, a prisoner 
does not lose all their s. 8 rights for the 
duration of their confinement.  “While 
expectations of privacy are severely 
diminished, they are not eliminated,” 
said Justice Huddart. 
The ICCS was a system designed to give prisoners 
the ability to make telephone calls while providing  a 
measure of security for the correctional facility. 
Under British Columbia’s Correction Act an inmate’s 
telephone calls can be recorded and monitored, 
within the limits of the legislation. The legislation is 
made available to inmates and a booklet explaining 
that telephone conversations may be recorded was 
also provided. As well, the “B.C. Corrections Branch 
Adult Custody Policy” requires that all inmates, on 
admission, receive and sign a written notice advising 
that telecommunications are recorded and may be 
monitored and every telephone location has a notice 
posted immediately adjacent to it stating, “All 
telecommunications, other than those to privileged 
parties, are recorded and may be listened to.” 
Further, when an inmate makes or receives a call 
(other than a privileged call), they hear a warning 
that “this call is from a correctional institution and is 
recorded and subject to monitoring”:  
The comprehensive polices that are in place 
represent a considered compromise between 
inmate privacy and prison security. Inmates 
cannot be under any illusion that their 
conversations are absolutely private.  They are 
warned on coming  into the institution, on 
attending to make a phone call, and on the call 
being connected, that their calls are recorded, 
and may be listened to in limited circumstances.  
They are also told (and s. 15(2) of the Regulation 
establishes) that the recordings will not be 
accessed by persons outside the correctional 
service without lawful authority.
In the circumstances, it is my view that inmates 
have a diminished (but not extinguished) 
expectation of privacy in their telephone 
conversations. They must expect that their calls 
will be recorded, and are on notice that they 
may be listened to by authorized officials in 
limited circumstances.  They 
are also entitled to expect 
that the contents of their 
conversations will be kept 
c o n f i d e n t i a l by t h o s e 
authorized officials except in 
very limited circumstances – 
situations detailed in the 
r e g u l a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g 
s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e t h e 
conversations evidence a threat to persons or to 
the security of the prison. [paras. 84-85]
In holding  that the accused had a privacy interest in 
the contents of the recordings sufficient to engage s. 
8 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal stated:
In my view, ... routine, passive recording of 
inmate telephone calls is not a violation of s. 8 
of the Charter. I do not agree, however, ... that 
once a call is recorded, an inmate has no 
privacy interest in its content. Rather, ... an 
inmate has some reasonable expectation of 
“[A]n inmate has some 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy in telephone calls, 
even though they are subject 
to being monitored.”  
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privacy in telephone calls, even though they are 
subject to being monitored. The expectation is 
not absolute. It is tempered by the realization 
that the calls will be intercepted to the extent 
authorized by the regulations. It is an 
expectation that calls will only be listened to for 
proper purposes by prison officials, and that 
those officials will not disseminate the 
recordings further in the absence of a judicial 
authorization or exceptional circumstances (e.g. 
where the calls disclose concerns for the security 
or operation of the institution).
In summary, [the accused] could not expect his 
telephone conversations to be immune from 
interception by prison authorities.  He could also 
hold no expectation that those authorities would 
refrain from involving the police if his 
conversations disclosed threats to security. He 
was entitled, however, to expect that prison 
authorities would listen to the conversations 
only where the statutory pre-conditions were 
met, and to expect that routine conversations 
that had no apparent connection with crime or 
prison security would be kept confidential by 
any prison official who heard them. [paras. 
98-99]
Thus, recording  the telephone conversations was 
proper but it was inappropriate for prison authorities 
to provide the recordings to the police absent 
judicial authorization.  
Production Order
Here, the police obtained a production order under 
s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code for copies of the 
recordings.   If the production order was valid then s.
8  of the Charter would not have been breached. If it 
was not valid then the evidence was obtained in 
violation of s.8. Before issuing  a production order, 
the justice or judge must be satisfied, among  other 
things, that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
the documents or data will afford evidence 
respecting  the commission of the offence. In the 
affidavit supporting  the production order there was 
only one paragraph addressing  this element. It stated 
that police had information from a confidential 
informant that accused had called his brother after 
his arrest and had confessed to him involvement in 
several robberies. But this was not enough:
... In my view, the affidavit was deficient.  It 
simply set out the fact that a confidential tip had 
been received. The tip was not detailed, and the 
affidavit provided no indication of the source of 
the informant’s information. There was no 
evidence tending to confirm the veracity of the 
tip. Further, the officer who swore the affidavit 
testified that no investigation of the informant’s 
background had, to his knowledge, been 
conducted and that he did not know whether the 
informant had provided reliable information in 
the past.  In short, neither the affidavit nor the 
surrounding  circumstances provide any basis for 
a conclusion that the confidential informant was 
reliable.
The affidavit, in essence, left the judicial justice 
of the peace with no information other than that 
someone of unknown reliability had reported to 
a police officer that he had information (the 
nature of which was unknown) which led him to 
believe that [the accused] confessed to a crime 
in the course of a telephone conversation. That 
cou ld no t sa t i s fy the requ i rement o f 
s.  487.012(3)(b) that there be reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the recordings 
of the telephone conversations contained 
evidence respecting  the commission of the 
robberies.  The affidavit evidence provided to 
the  J.J.P. was not sufficient for the granting of a 
production order, and the order ought not to 
have been granted. [paras. 108-109]
Since the production order was not validly issued 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights were breached and 
the Court of Appeal excluded the evidence under s.
24(2). The breach was relatively serious and the 
effect of exclusion on the truth-seeking  function of 
the trial would have been minimal.  But the 
inadmissible evidence played no role whatsoever in 
the trial judge’s decision to convict the accused and 
had no effect on the outcome of the trial; thus the 
error in admitting  the evidence was harmless. The 
accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS CONVICTION
R. v. Au-Yeung, 2010 BCCA 367
A t o w n h o u s e s u s p e c t e d o f 
containing  a marihuana grow 
operation came to the attention of 
police due to traffic between it and 
another suspected grow-op in the 
area. After conducting  surveillance of the townhouse 
and detecting  the odour of marihuana, police 
decided to obtain a search warrant. While the 
Information to Obtain was being  prepared the 
accused drove up to the unit; the garage door 
opened and the accused backed a car in and 
remained inside for 37 minutes.  The garage door 
then opened and he drove the vehicle, which he did 
not own, out. He was stopped by police and was 
arrested immediately; he asked for his keys and 
wallet. On opening  the trunk of the car there was a 
strong  odour of marihuana. A suitcase containing 
five pounds of marihuana and $10,000 in cash was 
found. Police also found an electronic garage door 
opener and keys, as well as the accused’s wallet, 
which had a business card from Vancity Garden 
Supplies and two swimming  passes, one in his 
name. A search warrant was obtained for the 
townhouse and the garage door opener from the car 
was used to open the garage and the keys were used 
to open the door. Inside the home police found a 
large marihuana grow operation consisting  of several 
hundred marihuana plants as well as dried 
marihuana packaged in Ziploc bags identical to 
those found in the trunk of the car. They also found a 
receipt from Vancity Garden Supplies. There was 
evidence only of a female occupant.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused’s explanation for his presence at the house 
and the suitcase full of cash and marihuana in the 
car was rejected as unbelievable. The accused’s joint 
ownership and control of the grow-op and 
knowledge and control of the marihuana in the car 
was based on circumstantial evidence, including: 
• his relationship with the townhouse and the car 
owner; 
• the availability of the car to him; 
• police surveillance linking  him to the 
townhouse unit; 
• the garage door opener and house keys found 
in his possession; 
• his direct opening  of and entrance into the 
garage; 
• asking  for the keys to the house upon his arrest; 
and
• the marihuana found in the car was of the same 
weight and packaging  as marihuana found in 
the house.  
He was convicted of producing  a controlled 
substance and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among  other grounds, that 
the circumstantial evidence was not capable of 
supporting  the convictions. But this submission was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal. “In this case, the 
circumstantial evidence was overwhelming,” said 
Justice Bennett speaking  for the Court. “It all pointed 
towards the [accused] having  knowledge and 
control of the marihuana in the trunk of the car. It 
also pointed to his knowledge of and involvement in 
the grow-op.” There was no reason to disturb the 
trial judge’s findings and the accused’s appeal 
against the guilty verdicts was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Alcohol Consumption
“The odour of alcohol on one’s 
breath is some indication of 
the consumption of alcohol, 
but no indication of the 
amount consumed” - Ontario Court of Appeal 
Justice Doherty in R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488 
at para. 16.. 
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INVOLVEMENT WITH GROW OP 
DOES NOT ALWAYS ESTABLISH 
PRIVACY INTEREST
R. v. Stein, 2010 BCCA 173
A police officer flying  a helicopter 
discovered an outdoor marihuana 
plantation in a rural area. The next 
day he returned with other officers. 
He circled low over the property and 
two vehicles were seen there; one belonged to the 
accused. It drove from plots of marihuana and 
stopped at a residence on the property. The truck 
driven by the accused was stopped by police after it 
hastily left the property. The accused was arrested 
and a strong  smell of marihuana was noted on his 
clothing. The helicopter landed on the property and 
the police looked around. The outdoor marihuana 
grow operation was capable of producing  an 
estimated $3M of marihuana at street value. Police 
subsequently obtained a warrant and also searched 
the accused’s truck. In the house they found a 
considerable amount of dried marihuana and an 
overnight bag  with his personal effects. In the truck, 
leased in the accused’s name, police found a 
checkbook in his name, as well as a schematic 
diagram of the grow areas, a how to grow 
marihuana book entitled “Marihuana Flower 
Forcing”, and a bag  containing  plastic baggies, 
clippers, a scale and a Tupperware container with 
marihuana leaves and bud. There was also a strong 
smell of marihuana about the truck. The farm 
property itself was owned by 
someone else.
At trial in British 
C o l u m b i a S u p r e m e 
Court the accused sought 
standing  to challenge the 
validity of the search warrant issued for the property. 
But the trial judge refused the accused’s request. He 
found the accused had no standing  to challenge the 
search warrant related to the property and therefore 
no voir dire was held. The Crown’s argument that the 
accused had possession and control of the drugs 
found on the property was not enough for him to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
was only found there; he did not own, occupy, 
control, historically use, regulate access, nor hold an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy over 
the land. The trial judge nonetheless held there was 
sufficient circumstantial evidence to find the 
accused was actively involved in the grow operation 
such that he was guilty of producing  marihuana and 
possessing it for the purpose of trafficking.
The accused challenged his convictions to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, submitting  that he 
should have been granted standing  to challenge the 
warrant and search of the property. He suggested 
that since the Crown asserted his presence and 
association with the grow operation was sufficient 
for a conviction, then the trial judge erred in not 
granting  him standing  to challenge the search of the 
farm property. Justice Hall, however, in delivering 
the decision for the Court of Appeal, upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling. Even though the accused had been 
about the property and was involved in the 
marihuana plantation, the Crown contended it did 
not need to assert the accused had a propriety or 
possessory interest in the property to get a 
conviction. “It was [the accused’s] involvement with 
the grow operation that was significant, not his 
involvement with the property,” said Justice Hall. A 
person who seeks standing  to challenge a search or 
the issuance of a search warrant bears the onus of 
demonstrating  a sound evidentiary foundation that 
they have a privacy interest. In some situations an 
accused will establish this, such as when the Crown 
argues that an accused should be found in 
possession of items in or about a property because 
they have an ownership interest in or control of the 
property. In other cases, as was here, being  about 
the property will not be sufficient to establish a 
privacy interest but can nevertheless found a 
conviction. The Court of Appeal concluded that the 
trial judge did not err when he declined to enter into 
a voir dire to determine whether police infringed the 
accused’s privacy interest.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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HOME FORFEITURE NOT 
DISPROPORTIONATE DESPITE 
ABSENCE OF CRIMINAL RECORD
R. v. Wu, 2010 BCCA 366
Responding  to a person in distress 
call, the police attended a residence 
to find the accused outside on the 
rear steps. They 
entered the home 
and discovered the accused’s 
common-law wife, her mother, 
and his three year old son. Not 
finding  anyone in distress, they 
did discover a large marihuana 
grow operation in the basement of 
the house. The accused, who did 
not live at the home, owned the 
property. He had no criminal 
record nor was he associated with 
organized crime. The property was 
valued at $367,000 with a 
$152,000 mortgage; leaving  the 
accused with $215,000 in equity. 
The accused was found guilty in 
British Columbia Provincial Court of producing 
marihuana and possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. After the trial his common law 
wife and their son returned to China while the 
accused moved back into the property. He was 
sentenced to a nine month conditional sentence and 
his house was ordered forfeited.  
The accused appealed the forfeiture order to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. Under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, if a person is 
convicted of a designated substance offence and the 
court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that 
any property is offence-related and that the offence 
was committed in relation to that property, the court 
shall order the property forfeited. When the 
forfeiture of a dwelling  house (real property) is 
involved, the court must be satisfied that the impact 
of such a forfei ture order would not be 
disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding  the 
commission of the offence and the criminal record, 
if any, of the person convicted of the offence. 
The accused argued that the sentencing  judge erred 
in forfeiting  the entire property and should have 
considered partial forfeiture only. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed, holding  that the order of complete 
forfeiture was not disproportionate, taking  into 
account all of the circumstances, including  his 
financial circumstances. “The financial success of 
the grow-op in question is a relevant consideration, 
as is the offender’s equity in the property, but the 
effect of forfeiture on him personally no longer 
appears to be a factor to be 
cons idered when making  a 
forfeiture order,” said Justice 
Bennett.  “The purposes of the 
for fe i ture provis ions in the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act include taking  the profit out of 
the production and trafficking  of 
drugs. There is also a punitive 
aspect to the effect of a forfeiture 
order.  There is also a preventive 
aspect, as the tools of the crime 
are removed from the criminal.” 
Here, there was no question that 
the house was “offence-related 
property”; the accused had 
converted his basement from a rental suite to a large 
urban grow operation. In deciding  whether forfeiture 
was disproportionate in the circumstances, the 
following factors will be taken into account:
• the nature and gravity of the offence, including 
the character and quantity of the substance 
involved, the level of sophistication of the crime 
and the extent of the commercial production or 
distribution;
✦“This was a fairly large grow-op in an urban 
setting. There were four growing rooms 
engaged, and 398  plants at various stages of 
development, along with harvested 
marihuana bud.  The police expert opined 
that this was “6 out of 10” in terms of 
sophistication.   While I am not entirely clear 
what the parameters of that scale are, I think 
it is safe to say that it was not the most 
sophisticated grow-op the expert has seen, 
but i t was c lear ly for commercia l 
production. The plants were well tended and 
the operation was capable of producing 
“The purposes of the 
forfeiture provisions ... 
include taking the profit out 
of the production and 
trafficking of drugs. There is 
also a punitive aspect to the 
effect of a forfeiture order.  
There is also a preventive 
aspect, as the tools of the 
crime are removed from the 
criminal.”  
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$163,000 every three to four months.  In 
other words, it was approximately a half-
million dollar per year operation.” [para. 25]
• the circumstances surrounding  the commission 
of the offence, including  the offender’s role in 
the offence, the nature of the property and the 
manner in which it was used in the commission 
of the offence, risks to the community, whether 
the use detrimentally affected legitimate use of 
the property, whether the property was fortified 
or adapted to accommodate the offence, the 
extent of the involvement of the offender in 
organized crime; 
✦ the trial judge found that the grow-op 
belonged to the accused.  Although he did 
not live at the property, he owned it and 
was at the premises when the police 
arrived.  His common-law wife and child 
lived there. The property was in a residential 
suburban neighbourhood. It was a two-level 
home with a main floor and basement. The 
entire basement was converted to be used 
as a grow-op. Electricity was not stolen but 
the electrical system had been rigged which 
was hazardous and posed a fire hazard to 
neighbours.  Grow-ops are notoriously 
dangerous to neighbourhoods as a result of 
the violence associated with the drug world, 
as well as the risk of fire from poor 
electrical installations.  The risk of fire or 
exposure to violence to the community was 
significant in this case. There was evidence 
$800 a month in rental income could have 
been received had the suite not been 
converted to a grow-op. Thus, the legitimate 
use of the property was ser iously 
impinged.  The main floor was used as a 
residence, although the fireplace was 
entirely blocked off to facilitate venting  the 
grow-op through the chimney. After the 
arrest, the accused converted the basement 
back to a suite and he now resided in the 
basement while other relatives occupied the 
top floor.  His wife returned to China with 
their son upon her acquittal.
• whether the offender has a criminal record.
✦ the accused did not have a prior criminal 
record nor was there evidence that he was 
involved with organized crime.
The accused suggested that he did not steal 
electricity nor have illegal guns on the premises 
which should be considered mitigating  factors. But 
this was rejected. “I do not see how partial 
obedience of the law mitigates the circumstances of 
the offence,” said Justice Bennett. “Those crimes are 
often associated with grow-ops, but they are 
aggravating  factors when present, not mitigating 
factors when they are not present.” In dismissing  the 
accused’s appeal against complete forfeiture, the 
Court of Appeal stated:
This was a substantial commercial grow 
operation in an urban setting.  The profits were 
significant and the crop was continual.  The 
property was altered in order to accommodate 
the grow-op.  The risk of danger from fire and 
drug-related violence to [the accused’s] family 
and neighbours was always present.  His profit 
for six months of cultivation equalled the equity 
in his house. [para. 40]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Wilful Blindness
“Wilful blindness does not define 
the mens rea for particular 
offences. Rather it can substitute 
for actual knowledge whenever 
knowledge is a component of the mens rea. The 
doctrine of wilful blindness imputes knowledge to 
an accused whose suspicion is aroused to the point 
where he or she sees the need for further 
enquiries, but deliberately chooses not to make 
those enquiries. ... [A] finding of wilful blindness 
involves an affirmative answer to the question: 
Did the accused shut his eyes because he knew or 
strongly suspected that looking would fix him 
with knowledge?” - Supreme Court of Canada 
Justice Charron in R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 at para. 21. 
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HARD ENTRY OK
RULES SUPREME COURT
R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31
 
After receiving  information from a 
confidential informant about a 
“dial‑a‑dope” cocaine trafficking 
operation, police obtained three 
search warrants under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act for two dwelling  houses 
and a motor vehicle. The operation was believed to 
be connected to an organized criminal group known 
as the “Fresh Off the Boat” gang, which was engaged 
in a violent war with another criminal gang. There 
had been a number of deaths 
and shootings. A tactical team 
was to be used a t both 
residences and for the vehicle 
stop. The team would secure 
the sites and then turn them 
over to the investigators who 
would conduct the searches. 
The accused was not the target 
of the investigation, but it was 
believed his home was used for 
r e l oad ing  d rug s . A t t he 
accused’s residence the tactical team conducted an 
unannounced hard (or dynamic) entry consisting  of 
nine police officers with weapons drawn. The 
officers were wearing  balaclavas and body armour. 
Police used a battering  ram on the front door and 
entered the house yelling, “Police, search warrant”. 
The accused’s 29-year-old mentally challenged 
brother was the only one in the house and was taken 
down and handcuffed. He became emotionally 
distressed, but within four minutes was uncuffed and 
comforted. The tactical team did not have the 
warrant in hand  when they entered the house. 
Instead, the lead investigator who was waiting  for 
the house to be secured had a copy of the warrant 
and entered the residence about four minutes after 
the tactical team went in. No one asked to see the 
warrant at the time of entry. Police found 99.4 grams 
of cocaine in the corner of the accused’s basement 
bedroom. He was later arrested at his workplace.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench  the 
accused admitted possessing  the cocaine for the 
purposes of trafficking. But he challenged the 
manner in which the search was conducted. The trial 
judge upheld the search and found that the police 
provided a reasonable explanation for conducting  a 
forced entry in all of the circumstances. They wanted 
to ensure both that the cocaine was not destroyed 
and were concerned with their safety, as well as the 
safety of the public (including  possible occupants of 
the house). The police had reasonable grounds to 
anticipate either the use of violence by the residents 
of the home or the destruction of evidence. They had 
reasonable grounds to believe that a cocaine 
trafficker associated with violent people was 
welcome in the home. Plus, the 
judge found the police had no 
means of knowing  before 
executing  the warrant who, if 
anybody, was in the residence 
or whether there was anyone 
inside who might destroy the 
cocaine, if there was any, upon 
learning  of the police presence 
at the door. The police had 
done what could reasonably be 
expected in formulating  their 
decision to use a forced entry. As for the entry team 
not having  a copy of the warrant with them, the 
judge reasoned each member of the police team 
executing  the warrant did not need to have a copy 
on their person. The warrant was present at the 
scene and it was reasonable for the tactical team to 
first secure the premises and for the lead investigator 
to wait outside with the warrant until it was safe to 
enter.
By a 2:1 majority the Alberta Court of Appeal 
dismissed the accused’s appeal and affirmed the 
conviction. “Section 8  of the Charter does not 
require the police to put their lives or safety on the 
line if there is even a low risk of weapons being 
present,” said Justice Slatter. The majority concluded 
that the search warrant was properly issued and that 
the search itself was conducted reasonably. But 
Justice O’Brien dissented, concluding  that the police 
made no separate assessment of the residence to 
determine whether the execution of the warrant 
“[T]he police must be allowed a 
certain amount of latitude in the 
manner in which they decide to 
enter premises. They cannot be 
expected to measure in advance 
with nuanced precision the amount 
of force the situation will require.”  
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would give rise to a real threat of violence. In his 
view, the unannounced and violent entry into a 
private dwelling  by masked police officers, with 
weapons drawn, and without the search warrant in 
their possession, could not be justified under the 
circumstances. The police provided no information, 
specific to the residence or its inhabitants, which 
could justify the manner of the search. He would 
have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, again submitting  that the manner of entry 
by the members of the police tactical team was 
unreasonable in the circumstances. In his view, the 
use of a forced, unannounced entry with masked 
officers was not proper. He suggested, in part, that 
the police had inadequate information to support the 
decision to use a hard entry, and that they ought to 
have taken further investigative steps. As well, they 
did not have a copy of the search warrant with them 
at the time of entry. Before addressing  the accused’s 
arguments, Justice Cromwell, for the four member 
majority, first summarized the law regarding 
unannounced, forced entries. 
For a search to be reasonable search under s. 8  of 
the Charter it must be:
• authorized by law; 
• the authorizing  law must itself be reasonable; 
and
• the search must be conducted in a  reasonable 
manner. 
The onus is on an accused to prove the search 
breached s. 8 of the Charter.
 
Knock and Announce
 
In discussing unannounced entry the majority stated:
Except in exigent circumstances, police officers 
must make an announcement before forcing 
entry into a dwelling  house. In the ordinary case, 
they should give: “(i) notice of presence by 
knocking or ringing  the door bell; (ii) notice of 
authority, by identifying themselves as law 
enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, 
by stating a lawful reason for entry. [para. 18]
And further:
 
Where the police depart from this approach, 
there is an onus on them to explain why they 
thought it necessary to do so.  If challenged, the 
Crown must lay an evidentiary framework to 
support the conclusion that the police had 
reasonable grounds to be concerned about the 
possibility of harm to themselves or occupants, 
or about the destruction of evidence. The greater 
the departure from the principles of announced 
entry, the heavier the onus on the police to 
justify their approach.  The evidence to justify 
such behaviour must be apparent in the record 
and available to the police at the time they 
acted. The Crown cannot rely on ex post facto 
justifications. ... [W]hat must be present is 
evidence to support the conclusion that “there 
were grounds to be concerned about the 
possibility of violence” [para. 20]
Thus, the main question in this case was “whether 
the police had reasonable grounds for concern  to 
justify use of an unannounced, forced entry while 
masked.” In answering  this question, Justice 
Cromwell noted that, in addition to according  the 
trial judge substantial fact finding  deference, two 
other factors were important:
• “[T]he decision by the police must be judged by 
what was or should reasonably have been 
known to them at the time, not in light of how 
things turned out to be.  Just as the Crown 
cannot rely on after-the-fact justifications for the 
search, the decision about how to conduct it 
c anno t be a t t acked on the ba s i s o f 
circumstances that were not reasonably known 
to the police at the time. ... Whether there 
existed reasonable grounds for concern about 
safety or destruction of evidence must not be 
viewed “through the ‘lens of hindsight’ ”.  
• “[T]he police must be allowed a certain amount 
of latitude in the manner in which they decide 
to enter premises. They cannot be expected to 
measure in advance with nuanced precision the 
amount of force the situation will require. ... It is 
often said of security measures that, if 
something  happens, the measures were 
inadequate but that if nothing  happens, they 
were excessive. These sorts of after-the-fact 
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assessments are unfair  and inappropriate when 
applied to situations like this where the officers 
must exercise discretion and judgment in 
difficult and fluid circumstances.  The role of the 
reviewing  court in assessing  the manner in 
which a search has been conducted is to 
appropriately balance the rights of suspects with 
the requirements of safe and effective law 
enforcement, not to become a Monday morning 
quarterback.” 
In this case, the majority agreed with the trial judge 
that the police had sufficient information to justify 
their decision to undertake a hard, no-knock entry. 
They had a genuinely held belief that was 
reasonably based; there were ample grounds for the 
police to be concerned about violence and the 
destruction of evidence: 
 
• It was reasonable for the police to be concerned 
about their safety and the safety of other 
occupants given their experience that cocaine 
traffickers frequently use violence. A cocaine 
trafficker who associated with violent people 
was welcome in the residence. In a dial-a-dope 
operation, the dealer usually has a place from 
which to operate  that could contain drugs, 
money, weapons, and score sheets.  Reloading 
residences, like the one suspected here, are 
used to reduce the risk of losing  large amounts 
of drugs or money in the event of a police stop 
while making deliveries; 
• The police had reasonable grounds to be 
concerned that the evidence would be 
destroyed because they believed that cocaine 
would be found in the premises and it is a 
substance that may be easily destroyed;
• No circumstances arose before the search 
warrant was executed which might remove the 
exigency of the situation;
• The police had no means of knowing  who, if 
anybody, was in the residence or whether there 
was any person in the residence who would 
destroy the cocaine evidence if they learned of 
police presence at the door;
• The fact that the occupants of the house had no 
prior criminal record did not affect the 
reasonableness of the police concern that 
evidence could be destroyed. Evidence could 
just as easily be destroyed by someone without 
a criminal as a person with a criminal record; 
• The day before entry a vehicle associated with 
the dial-a-dope operation was occupied by an 
individual with an extensive criminal record, 
which included weapons and drug  charges, and 
an individual believed involved in the operation 
had driven to the accused’s residence, pulled up 
to the rear, and its driver left the vehicle and 
appeared to retrieve something  from the yard of 
the residence near the fence. The car was 
stopped about an hour later and its driver was 
wearing  body armour and was in possession of 
cocaine and cash.  There was good reason to be 
concerned about violence. If this person thought 
his business was dangerous enough to justify 
wearing  body armour, it can hardly have been 
unreasonable for the police to think the same 
thing. These additional facts strengthened the 
grounds to believe that cocaine would be in the 
residence (and therefore liable to be easily 
destroyed) and that a violent reaction to entry 
might be encountered.
 
As for the use of masks by police, the Supreme Court 
found it was not appropriate for a court to review 
every detail of the search in isolation. Instead, the 
question was “whether the search overall, in light of 
the facts reasonably known to the police, was 
reasonable,” said Justice Cromwell. “Having 
determined that a hard entry was justified, I do not 
think that the court should attempt to micromanage 
the police’s choice of equipment.” He also noted 
that this was not a case where police were relying 
on a blanket policy to always use a hard entry 
during  a search in the absence of evidence 
indicating  a risk of violence or destruction of 
evidence.  
Nor were the police required to undertake further 
investigation. “The police did not just show up at a 
previously uninvestigated residence and barge in,” 
said Justice Cromwell. The police had surveilled the 
residence on three occasions before the day of entry 
for almost 10 hours and, on the day of entry, they 
continually watched the house from the morning 
until entry was made in the evening. The police had 
also checked  several computerized databases. “The 
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police reasonably believed that the [accused’s] 
residence was being  used in a criminal drug  dealing 
enterprise carried on by members of a violent 
criminal gang  and that the [accused] had some 
association with at least one gang  member,” wrote 
Justice Cromwell. “The police were entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from these facts.”  Here, the 
search was reasonable given the facts collectively 
known to the police.  
 
Failure to Have Warrant in Hand
 
As for the accused’s contention that the search was 
unreasonable because the tactical team did not have 
a copy of the warrant when it made the entry, it too 
was rejected. Section 29(1) of the Criminal Code 
reads, “[i]t is the duty of every one who executes a 
process or warrant to have it with him, where it is 
feasible to do so, and to produce it when requested 
to do so.” No one ever asked to see a copy of the 
warrant. Therefore, there was no issue of any failure 
to produce the warrant when requested to do so. All 
15 members (nine tactical and six investigative) 
were not required to have a copy of the warrant with 
them. The majority said the sensible, purposive, and 
appropriate interpretation of s. 29(1) in the context 
of a search with multiple officers was that they were 
not all required to have a copy. The lead investigator 
had a copy of the warrant and was in the residence 
within four minutes. The role of the tactical team 
was to make the entry and secure the premises and 
then turn the site over to the investigators who 
would actually perform the search. It was sufficient 
that the police team had a copy of the warrant with 
them when executing it:
[T]he purpose of s. 29(1) is to allow the 
occupant of the premises to be searched to 
know why the search is being  carried out, to 
allow assessment of his or her legal position and 
to know as well that there is a colour of 
authority for the search, making forcible 
resistance improper. These purposes, in my view, 
are fully achieved by insisting  that the warrant 
be in the possession of at least one member of 
the team of officers executing  the warrant.  
While I think it is a better practice for someone 
among the first group of officers in the door to 
have a copy on his or her person, I would not 
conclude that the officers failed to have the 
warrant with them when a copy was in the 
possession of the primary investigator who was 
in charge of the search and immediately at hand. 
Moreover, it cannot in my view be said that the 
police conduct in relation to the warrant 
contributed in any respect to making this search 
unreasonable. [para. 43]
 
The search was not unreasonable and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
A Different View
Justice Fish, writing  a three member dissenting 
opinion, found the force used by police was not 
justified. He found that the police had no reasonable 
belief that a dynamic entry was necessary to protect 
the safety of the officers nor that evidence would be 
concealed or destroyed by anyone present or likely 
to be present at the time if they did not make a swift 
entry.  As well, tactical team members were bound 
by s. 29 of the Criminal Code to have the search 
warrant with them and there was no evidence that 
this was not feasible. He concluded that the search 
did not comply with the statutory constraints of s. 12 
of the CDSA, nor the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights:
 
The absence of any prior investigation regarding 
the [accused’s] home and its occupants; the 
violence and destructiveness of the entry; the 
force used to subdue the sole, mentally disabled 
occupant of the house; the total failure to justify 
departure from the “knock and announce” rule 
in respect of the [accused’s] residence; the use of 
masks without justification; the use of drawn 
weapons without any reason to suspect that their 
physical security was at risk; the failure of the 
entering officers to have with them, as required 
by law, the search warrant under which they 
were acting; and all the other facts and 
circumstances I have mentioned leave me with 
no doubt that the police in this case violated the 
right of the [accused], enshrined in s. 8 of the 
Charter, “to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure”.
The minority would have excluded the evidence 
under s. 24(2), set aside the accused’s conviction, 
and substituted an acquittal. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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SIMPLY VIEWING IMAGES 
ONLINE DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
CONSTITUTE POSSESSION
R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8
A computer technician attended the 
accused’s residence to install a high-
speed Internet connection for a home 
computer. In the spare bedroom 
where the computer was located the 
technician observed a web-cam on a tripod which 
was plugged into a VCR. The web-cam was pointed 
toward the accused’s three-year-old daughter who 
was playing  with some toys on the floor. On the 
computer screen desktop the technician observed 
two icons, one entitled “Lolita Porn” and one 
entitled “Lolita XXX”. Because he could not 
complete the high-speed Internet connection that 
day, the technician returned the following  day to 
complete the task and now observed that the 
children’s toys were put away, the web-cam was 
turned toward the computer chair, the computer 
hard drive had been formatted, and all website links 
were removed from the desktop. A couple of months 
later the technician reported what he had seen to the 
police. The investigating  officer also obtained some 
information from a colleague experienced in 
investigating  child exploitation offences. He was told 
that persons involved in these types of crimes 
treasure child pornography collections, categorizing 
and cataloguing  images. An active Internet 
connection was verified as still being  provided to the 
residence and an information to obtain a search 
warrant was drafted a couple of months later and 
signed by a justice. 
At trial the accused challenged the validity of the 
search warrant, arguing  the information was so 
flawed that the justice could not have been satisfied 
there were reasonable grounds to issue it. The trial 
judge concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
to allow the authorizing  justice to grant the warrant. 
The accused was convicted of possessing  child 
pornography and given an 18 month conditional 
sentence. His appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal was dismissed by a majority. Justice 
Richards, however, dissented and would have 
allowed the appeal because he opined that the trial 
judge erred in holding  that there was a reasonable 
belief that the accused’s computer contained child 
pornography. Thus, in his view, the search  breached 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada contending  that the search warrant was 
invalid because there were no reasonable grounds. 
He submitted that the search of his computer 
breached his s. 8 Charter rights and that the 
evidence found on his computer should have been 
excluded. The Crown, on the other hand, suggested 
that there were reasonable grounds justifying  the 
issuance of the warrant and, even if the warrant was 
improperly issued, the evidence should be admitted 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter and the accused’s 
conviction affirmed. In a 4:3 ruling, however, the 
Supreme Court of Canada overturned the accused‘s 
conviction.   
Possessing v. Accessing Child Pornography
The majority first elaborated on the distinctions 
between possessing  child pornography and 
accessing  it. The accused was charged with, and the 
warrant was based on, possession not access. 
Possessing  child pornography is an offence under s.
163.1(4) of the Criminal Code. Justice Fish, however, 
found that “merely viewing  in a Web browser an 
image stored in a remote location on the Internet 
does not establish the level of control necessary to 
find possession. Possession of illegal images requires 
possession of the underlying  data files in some way.  
Simply viewing  images online constitutes the 
separate crime of accessing child pornography 
[under] s. 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.” 
 
“Possession”, defined in s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code, 
includes personal possession, constructive 
possession, and joint possession.  Knowledge and 
control are essential elements common to both 
personal and constructive possession, the two types 
of possession applicable to this case. In terms of 
personal possession, an “accused must be aware that 
he or she has physical custody of the thing  in 
question, and must be aware as well of what that 
thing  is. Both elements must co-exist with an act of 
control (outside of public duty).”  
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Constructive possession is established where the 
accused did not have physical custody of the object 
in question, but did have it “in the actual possession 
or custody of another person” or “in any place, 
whether or not that place belongs to or is occupied 
by him, for the use or benefit of himself or of 
another person.” Constructive possession is 
complete where the accused: (1) has   knowledge of 
the character of the object, (2) knowingly puts or 
keeps the object in a particular place, whether or 
not that place belongs to him or her, and (3) intends 
to have the object in the particular place for his or 
her “use or benefit” of that or another person.  
 
However, unlike tangible objects such as traditional 
photographs, virtual objects can be stored as digital 
files or displayed on computer monitors. Digital 
information encoding  the image can be possessed 
even if no representation of the image is visible.  
Similarly, information underlying  an image displayed 
on a person’s computer monitor might remain 
outside that person’s possession, located on a server 
thousands of kilometres away, over which that 
person has no control.  
 
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that 
the offence of possessing  child pornography as it 
relates to possession of an image  on a computer 
requires possession of the image (underlying  data) 
file and not just its decoded visual representation or 
mere depiction on-screen. This was so because:
• Parliament has made accessing  illegal child 
pornography a separate crime, different from 
possession; and
• The traditional objects of criminal possession, 
such as contraband, drugs, and illegal weapons, 
are all things, like a data file, that could 
potentially be transferred to another person.  
 
The Court stated:
Plainly, the mere fact that an image has been 
accessed by or displayed in a Web browser does 
not, without more, constitute possession of that 
image.  An ITO seeking a warrant to search for 
evidence of possession (rather than accessing) 
must therefore provide reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the alleged offender 
possesses (or   has possessed) digital files of an 
illegal image, and that evidence of that 
possession will be found in the place to be 
searched. It is not enough to provide reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that the alleged 
offender viewed or accessed illegal images using 
a computer, without knowingly taking 
possession — which includes control — of the 
underlying files in some way. [para. 31]
Nor did having  an Internet cache on a computer - 
copies of files automatically stored on the hard drive 
by a Web browser - constitute possession:
When accessing  Web pages, most Internet 
browsers will store on the computer’s own hard 
drive a temporary copy of all or most of the files 
that comprise the Web page.  This is typically 
known as a “caching function” and the location 
of the temporary, automatic copies is known as 
the “cache”.  While the configuration of the 
caching  function varies and can be modified by 
the user, cached files typically include images 
and are generally discarded automatically after a 
certain number of days, or after the cache grows 
to a certain size.
 
On my view of possession, the automatic 
caching  of a file to the hard drive does not, 
without more, constitute possession.   While the 
cached file might be in a   “place” over which 
the computer user has control, in order to 
establish possession, it is necessary to satisfy 
mens rea or fault requirements as well. Thus, it 
must be shown that the file was knowingly 
stored and retained through the cache. [paras. 
35-36]
 
Here, the charge was not based on the accused 
using  his cache to possess child pornography.   Most 
computer users are unaware of the contents of their 
cache, how it operates, or even its existence and, 
absent that awareness, they lack the mental or fault 
element essential to a finding  that they culpably 
possess the images in their cache.   
 
The Search - Reasonable Grounds
Justice Fish also concluded that, even if the offence 
of possession included viewing  an image (like the 
minority opined), the police nonetheless failed to 
establish the reasonable grounds necessary for the 
issuance of the search warrant. “Under the Charter, 
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before a search can be conducted, the police must 
provide ‘reasonable and probable grounds, 
established upon oath, to believe that an offence has 
been committed and that there is evidence to be 
found at the place of the search’,” said Justice Fish. 
“These distinct and cumulative requirements 
together form part of the ‘minimum standard 
consistent with s. 8 of the Charter  for authorizing 
search and seizure’”. But on amplification, there 
were erroneous statements that needed to be excised 
as well as numerous omissions that violated the 
police obligation to provide full and frank 
disclosure. The ITO was carelessly drafted, 
materially misleading, and factually incomplete. The 
informant was required to present all material facts, 
favourable or not; an informant must be careful not 
to “pick and choose” among  the relevant facts in 
order to achieve the desired outcome. Irrelevant or 
insignificant details may be omitted, but there must 
not be material non-disclosure.  
In this case the police officer selectively presented 
facts that painted a less 
objective and more villainous 
picture than what would have 
emerged had he disclosed all 
the mater ia l in format ion 
available to him at the time. 
Once stripped of its erroneous 
and tendentious assertions, and 
amplified on review, there was 
insuf f ic ient credible and 
reliable evidence to have 
permitted the justice to find 
reasonable grounds to believe 
that both the accused was in culpable possession of 
child pornography and that evidence of that crime 
would be found in his computer:
In short, ... the ITO in this case is reduced by 
scrutiny to two links in the browser’s list of 
“Favourites” — links that were known to have 
been erased four months earlier.  At best, this 
may be a ground for suspicion, but surely the 
deleted links afford no reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the [accused] was in 
possession of child pornography, and still less 
that evidence of that crime would be found 
upon a search of his computer.  
 
Once the material facts 
omitted from the ITO are 
taken into consideration, it is 
apparent that none of the 
other evidence in the ITO — 
principally the presence of the 
webcam and the claims about 
propensities of unspecified 
“types of offenders” — can 
elevate mere suspicion into 
suff icient grounds for a 
warrant.   [paras. 95-96]
 
Since the warrant should not 
have been issued, the search breached s. 8  of the 
Charter. The majority then analyzed the admissibility 
of evidence under s. 24(2). “Justice is blind in the 
sense that it pays no heed to the social status or 
personal characteristics of the litigants,” wrote 
Justice Fish. “But justice receives a black eye when it 
turns a blind eye to unconstitutional searches and 
seizures as a result of unacceptable police conduct 
or practices. The public must have confidence that 
invasions of privacy are justified, in advance, by a 
genuine showing  of probable cause.  To admit the 
evidence in this case and similar cases in the future 
would undermine that confidence in the long  term.” 
“Under the Charter, before a 
search can be conducted, the 
police must provide ‘reasonable ... 
grounds, established upon oath, 
to believe that an offence has 
been committed and that there is 
evidence to be found at the place 
of the search’.”  
What is Amplification?
When a reviewing Court assesses the sufficiency of a 
warrant application, it does not decide whether it 
would have issued the warrant, but must determine 
whether there was sufficient credible and reliable 
evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had 
been committed and that evidence of that offence 
would be found at the specified time and place. In 
doing so, the reviewing court does not only review 
the ITO that was presented to the justice of the 
peace but may also hear “amplification”, or additional 
evidence, presented at the voir dire to correct minor 
errors in the ITO. Erroneous information included in 
the original  ITO will be excluded. Amplification 
evidence may correct good faith police errors in 
preparing the ITO and some minor, technical errors in 
drafting the affidavit, but not deliberate attempts to 
mislead the authorizing justice. Amplification 
evidence, however, cannot be adduced as a means 
for police to retroactively authorize a search warrant 
that was not initially supported by reasonable 
grounds. 
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The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
excluded, his conviction quashed, and an acquittal 
entered. 
A Second Opinion
Justice Deschamps, writing  a three member minority 
opinion, had a more expansive conception of 
possession. In her view, the accused did not need to 
have control in a place belonging  to him, such as his 
hard drive.  Instead, constructive possession simply 
required the material to be “in any place” for the use 
or benefit of the accused. Even if the accused did 
not actually download offending  material, 
possession can be established if they have control 
over the material for their use or benefit, or for that 
of someone else. Thus, when reviewing  the 
authorization to search for evidence of child 
pornography possession, a court must ask whether 
there was credible evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an accused had control, and not that the 
material had been downloaded and was in fact in 
the computer. 
In this case, the minority also found that the search 
warrant was properly based on reasonable grounds. 
“Determining  whether evidence gives rise to 
[reasonable grounds for belief] does  not involve 
parsing  the facts or assessing  them mathematically,” 
said Justice Deschamps. “Rather, what the judge 
must do is identify credible facts that make the 
decision to authorize a search reasonable in view of 
all the circumstances.” It is a non-technical, 
common-sense approach. A reviewing  court does 
not ask whether it would have reached the same 
decision as the issuing  judge, thereby substituting  its 
own opinion for that of the issuing  judge. Instead, it 
merely determines whether there was credible 
evidence on which the issuing  judge’s decision 
could be based. And the onus lies with the accused 
to demonstrate that the ITO was insufficient. Here 
the minority concluded there was reliable evidence 
that might reasonably be believed as the basis for 
which the warrant could have issued. The search 
warrant was valid and there was no need to consider 
s. 24(2) and the exclusion of evidence.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
ADMINISTERING CHEMICAL WAS 
A ‘SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY 
OFFENCE’: CSO UNAVAILABLE
R. v. Carr, 2010 ONCA 290
Th e a c c u s e d p l e d g u i l t y t o 
administering  a chemical (Kathlon) 
with the intent to cause bodily harm 
under s. 245(a) of the Criminal Code. 
He began having  an extra-marital 
affair with the victim, his co-worker, for about five 
years. After the relationship ended the victim 
suffered burns and blisters to the bottom of her feet, 
back, thighs, arms, and abdomen. At one point the 
situation became so severe that she had difficulty 
walking  and needed to be off work. Her desk had 
also been tampered with; memos had gone missing, 
papers were moved, her computer was damaged, 
and notes were left on her desk. A private 
investigator installed hidden surveillance equipment 
to monitor her work area. The accused was seen 
tampering  with the victim’s work area and spraying  a 
substance, later determined to be Aciticide SPX 
Kathlon, on her chair, computer, and mouse. 
Kathlon is a chemical causing  severe itching, 
burning  and blistering  on contact with human skin. 
The trial judge, however, found the accused’s 
conduct did not amount to a “serious personal injury 
offence” under s. 752 of the Criminal Code such that 
a conditional sentence was available. He gave the 
accused an 18 month conditional sentence and two 
years probation. 
On appeal by the Crown the Ontario Court of 
Appeal found the accused’s conduct in this case did 
constitute a serious personal injury offence because 
“he plainly endangered the victim’s safety on any 
definition of endangerment and harm. He 
intentionally exposed her to a corrosive chemical 
that caused her serious bodily injury,” said the Court. 
He was also well aware of the harm he was causing. 
He used gloves to handle the substance and he 
attended a work place meeting  about the victim’s 
difficulties at work. He was clearly aware or wilfully 
blind to the harm he was causing. A custodial 
sentence of two years less a day was substituted.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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SENTENCE REDUCED TO PERMIT 
DEPORTATION APPEAL
R. v. B.R.C., 2010 ONCA 561
The accused pled guilty to sexual 
exploitation in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice. The Crown asked for 
three years in custody while the 
accused asked for a conditional 
sentence. The judge sentenced him to 30 months 
imprisonment. He had been in a position of trust 
and authority over the victim who was the son of his 
common law partner. The offence was prolonged 
(the victim was between 15 and 17 years old at the 
time of the offence) and included several acts of anal 
intercourse. The accused was a first-time offender, 
had a good employment history, expressed his 
remorse, was dealing  with a drug  and alcohol 
problem, and appeared to be a low risk to re-offend. 
He was subsequently ordered deported from Canada 
as a result of his conviction and sentence.
The accused, now 45 years old, appealed his 
sentence to the Ontario Court of Appeal contending 
that he was subject to a deportation order because 
his sentence was more than two years and, 
therefore, it should be reduced to allow him a 
chance to appeal. He had come to Canada from 
Scotland as a 14 month-old infant but neither he nor 
his parents took any steps to become a Canadian 
citizen. Under s. 64(2) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act  a foreign national or 
permanent resident may not appeal their deportation 
order to the Immigration Appeal Division on the 
grounds of serious criminality if the crime was 
punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at 
least two years.
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the 
accused, finding  the 30 month sentence was not fit 
because of the deportation order. It was lowered to 
two years less a day plus six months probation. “[I]n 
the unusual circumstances of this case, the certainty 
of deportation is a factor that properly tips the scale 
in favour of a sentence of two years less a day,” said 
Justice Sharpe, speaking  for the Court of Appeal. 
“While the sentencing  process should not be used to 
circumvent the provisions of the Immigration and 
BY THE BOOK:
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
Division 7 Right of Appeal
  s. 64(1) No appeal may be made to the 
Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign 
national or their sponsor or by a 
permanent resident if the foreign national 
or permanent resident has been found to 
be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating 
human or international rights, serious criminality or 
organized criminality.
Serious criminality
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious 
criminality must be with respect to a crime that was 
punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at 
least two years. 
Division 4 Inadmissibility
Serious criminality
s. 36(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is 
inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence 
under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum 
term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an 
offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term 
of imprisonment of more than six months has been 
imposed;
(b) having  been convicted of an offence outside 
Canada that, if committed in Canada, would 
constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament 
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at 
least 10 years; or
(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an 
offence in the place where it was committed and that, 
if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence 
under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum 
term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
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Refugee Act, the calculation of the appropriate 
sentence is not an exact science. Where there is a 
range of possible sentences, the fact that an offender 
will face deportation ‘is one of the factors which is 
to be taken into consideration … in conjunction 
with all of the other circumstances of the case’ in 
choosing  the appropriate sentence and tailoring  the 
sentence to fit the crime and the offender.” The Court 
so concluded for the following reasons:
1. The accused was within less than two months 
of his statutory release date. He had effectively 
served his custodial time. Reducing  the 
sentence and adding  a term of probation 
would not significantly interfere with the 
practical effect of the sentence imposed;
2. The accused had institutional reports 
indicating  he had made significant progress in 
custody, completing  programs to assist sex 
offenders and those with substance abuse 
problems, and that he was a low risk of re-
offending;
3. The accused had married his long-term 
partner who was a Canadian citizen;
4. It was apparent that he would almost certainly 
be deported to a country with which he had 
no meaningful connection if his sentence was 
not reduced.
“The sentencing  process must retain ‘a human 
face’,” said Justice Sharpe. “Appellate courts 
appropriately exercise their powers in exceptional 
cases to avoid unintended penal t ies and 
consequences that would be patently unjust and 
unfair.  …  It would be unfair and unjust to leave in 
place a sentence that would have the unintended 
effect of condemning  the [accused] to exile in a 
country with which he has no meaningful 
connection.” The accused’s sentence appeal was 
allowed.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LAWFUL PROBATION ORDER 
NOT NULLIFIED BY NEW 
SENTENCE
R. v. Knott, R. v. D.A.P., 2010 BCCA 386
Case 1: R. v. Knott
In 2005 the accused pled guilty to 
possessing  a weapon dangerous to 
the public peace (an axe), breaking 
and entering  a residence, possession 
o f s to len ident i f ica t ion , and 
obstruction of a police officer. He was sentenced to 
two years in prison followed by three years 
probation.  He was also sentenced to a one year 
concurrent sentence on a second charge of breaking 
and entering  with another three-year probation 
order.  The following  month, in a separate 
proceeding, he pled guilty to charges of possessing 
stolen property (an automobile), possession of break-
in instruments, and obstructing  a police officer.  He 
was sentenced to 16 months in prison, to be served 
concurrently with his other sentences, followed by 
three years of probation. During  his incarceration he 
assaulted a corrections officer and a week prior to 
the expiry of his two year custodial sentence he was 
sentenced to six months for the assault to be served 
consecutively to the sentence he was serving.  Four 
months later he was sentenced to eight months of 
incarceration plus a year probation for assaulting  an 
inmate. After serving  a total sentence of two years, 
11 months, and 16 days he was released and 
subsequently breached a condition of his 2005 
probation order; operating  a vehicle without the 
registered owner present.  He was sentenced to 60 
days for this breach.
Case 2: R. v. D.A.P.
The accused pled guilty to sexually assaulting  the 
13-year-old daughter and 9-year-old son of his 
common-law spouse.  He was sentenced to a 
conditional sentence of two years less a day plus 
three years of probation. Several months later he 
pled guilty to breaking  and entering  and unlawful 
confinement; he had forced entry into the residence 
of his former partner, the mother of the sexual abuse 
“The sentencing process must retain ‘a 
human face’.”  
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complainants. His conditional sentence was 
converted to incarceration and he was also 
sentenced to three years’ in prison on the new 
charges, to be served concurrently.
Ruling
The accuseds sought to have their lawfully imposed 
probation orders set aside because of the long-
standing  practice in applying  s. 139 of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) to 
nullify probation orders when an offender receives a 
cumulative sentence in excess of two years.  The 
Crown, on the other hand, challenged the law 
relating  to the retroactive invalidation of lawfully 
imposed probation orders as a result of these 
sentencing merger provisions.  
A division of five judges of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal was empaneled to hear the case. 
The law, as it stood at the time of the appeal, was to 
merge sentences under s. 139 of the CCRA and an 
otherwise lawfully imposed probation order was 
rendered invalid if an offender received a sentence 
that was cumulatively in excess of two years, 
regardless of when the sentences were imposed. 
Section 731(1) of the Criminal Code only allowed for 
the imposition of a probation order if the term of 
imprisonment did not exceed two years. Section 
139(1) of the CCRA deemed a person to have been 
sentenced to one sentence commencing  at the 
beginning  of the first of those sentences and ending 
on the expiration of the last sentence to be served.
Justices Hall and Bennett, co-authoring  the opinion 
for the unanimous Court of Appeal, re-examined 
these merger provisions to probation orders. Three 
applications of the “two year rule” found in 
jurisprudence were reconsidered as follows:
1. A single judge imposes a sentence at one sitting 
which, either individually or cumulatively, 
exceeds two years (eg.   consecutive sentences 
imposed at the same time by the same judge). 
This is a straightforward application of s. 731(1)
(b) of the Criminal Code and is an illegal 
sentence. Any probation order imposed at this 
time is unlawful and will be set aside. 
Section 139(1) of the CCRA is not engaged. 
BCCA ruling:  NO CHANGE. “[T]he judge who 
imposes a sentence at one sitting, which is 
either individually or cumulatively in excess of 
two years, cannot add probation to that 
sentence, on a plain reading  of s. 731(1),” said 
the Court of Appeal.
Sentence 1
24 months (2 yrs)
August 18, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
Sentence 2
12 months (1 yr)
August 18, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
 Sentence 3
16 months
September 8, 2005
+ 3 yrs. probation
 Sentence 4
6 months
August 10, 2007
Sentence 5
8 months
December 3, 2007
+ 1 yr. probation
breach 
probation    
January 
2009 
R. v. Knott Sentencing Grid
Offence(s):
-possess dangerous weapon
-break & enter
-possess stolen identification
-obstructing a police officer
Offence(s):
-break & enter
Offence(s):
-possess stolen automobile
-possess break-in instruments
-obstructing a police officer
Offence(s):
-assault (corrections officer)
Offence(s):
-assault (inmate)
*served total sentence of 2 yrs, 11 mos, 16 days*
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2. The offender is already serving  a sentence and 
a judge proposes to impose a further sentence 
(including  probation) which will bring  the total 
of the sentences beyond two years (eg. a 
sentence of two years or less with probation is 
imposed consecutive to a sentence the offender 
is currently serving).  There were two 
approaches in calculating  the two year rule 
when applying  the sentence merger provisions 
of s. 139 of the CCRA: (1) start with the 
remanent of the first sentence and add it to the 
second sentence or (2) start with the date on 
which the first sentence was imposed. Using 
either approach, probation orders had been 
found to be unlawful if the entire sentence 
exceeded two years. Therefore, in cases where 
the calculated sentence exceeded two years 
probation should not have been imposed. 
BCCA ruling:  Section s. 731(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Code clearly limits probation orders to 
situations where the sentence to be served does 
not exceed two years. Therefore, probation 
should not follow a sentence of more than two 
years or, put another way, probation should 
only be imposed if the total of the two 
sentences does not exceed two years. But the 
merger provisions of s. 139 of the CCRA used 
in calculating  the total sentence should start 
from the remanent of the first sentence, as 
opposed to starting  with the first day of the first 
sentence. If the total of the new sentence and 
the remanent exceeds two years, then 
probation should not be ordered or, said 
differently, a probation order may be imposed 
with a consecutive term of imprisonment if the 
remanent of the prior sentence combined with 
the new sentence does not exceed two years.
3. An offender has been sentenced to a lawful 
sentence and a probation order and a 
subsequent sentence results in the merged 
sentence extending  beyond two years.   In 
applying  s. 139 of the CCRA the otherwise 
lawful probation order would have been set 
aside if the offender was required to serve more 
than two years , ca lcula ted f rom the 
commencement of the first sentence. In other 
words, a lawful probation order was rendered 
illegal by the subsequent imposition of a 
custodial sentence that, when added to the pre-
existing  sentence, exceeded two years; the 
unlawfulness resulted by application of 
s. 139(1) of the CCRA.
BCCA ruling: Section  139 does not apply.  “A 
subsequent sentence should not be held to 
invalidate a prior lawful sentence,” said the 
Court. “Thus, regardless of any length of 
sentence imposed subsequent to a lawful 
probation order, the probation order is not 
nullified nor does it otherwise become 
unlawful by application of s. 139(1) of the 
Sentence 1
24 months (2 yrs) less a day CSO 
June 3, 2008
+ 3 yrs probation
Sentence 2
36 months (3 yrs) + CSO (sentence 1 above) converted to incarceration
February 19, 2009
R. v. D.A.P. Sentencing Grid
Corrections and Conditional Release Act
Multiple Sentences
Additional sentences
s.139(1) Where a person who is 
subject to a sentence that has not 
expired receives an additional 
sentence, the person is, for the 
purposes of the Criminal Code, the 
Prisons and Reformatories Act and this Act, deemed to 
have been sentenced to one sentence commencing at the 
beginning of the first of those sentences to be served and 
ending on the expiration of the last of them to be served.
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CCRA. The only exception is if the offender is 
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment 
because then he or she will be on parole for 
life.  No sentence can be consecutive to a life 
sentence, thus a probation order cannot follow 
a life sentence.  Any probation order in such 
circumstances would be redundant.”
Application
Both accuseds had a lawfully imposed probation 
order they were arguing  became unlawful because 
of the imposition of a subsequent sentence. Section 
139 did not apply to merge Knott’s sentences; the 
subsequent sentences did not invalidate the original 
probation order.  As for D.A.P., s. 139 also did not 
apply. The probation order had not yet commenced 
and his conditional sentence had not yet expired 
when he received an additional sentence of three 
years.  “The three year maximum term for the 
probation order is not violated because it will not 
come into effect until he is released,” said the Court 
of Appeal. “In both cases, the offenders were 
sentenced to lawful terms of probation. The 
imposition of the subsequent sentences does not 
reach back to invalidate the probation order.” Both 
appeals were dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
 
Editor’s note:  In R. v. G.E.R., 2001 NFCA 56, the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal also sat a five judge 
panel to revisit one of its earlier decisions on 
whether the total sentence was to be calculated from 
the commencement of the first sentence or from the 
remanent of it. It confirmed its previous decision and 
held that the sentence calculation started at the 
commencement of the initial sentence. The 
probation order in that case was set aside, even 
though it was otherwise a lawful sentence.  This 
reasoning  was most recently applied by the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Howse, 
2010 NLCA 40 (see Volume 10. Issue 4, p. 22). 
Perhaps the Supreme Court will weigh in on this 
someday and resolve the inconsistency across 
provincial appellate courts applying  the two year 
rule using s. 139 of the CCRA.
BY THE BOOK:
Probation Orders
Making a Probation Order (Criminal Code)
 s. 731(1) Where a person is convicted of 
an offence, a court may, having regard to 
the age and character of the offender, the 
n a t u r e o f t h e o f f e n c e a n d t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g i t s 
commission, (a) if no minimum punishment is 
prescribed by law, suspend the passing of sentence 
and direct that the offender be released on the 
conditions prescribed in a probation order; or (b) in 
addition to fining or sentencing the offender to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, 
direct that the offender comply with the conditions 
prescribed in a probation order.
Duration of Order
“[N]o probation order shall continue in force for more 
than three years after the date on which the order 
came into force”: s. 732.2(2)(b).  The three year 
maximum length is calculated from the date the order 
comes into force, not from the date it was imposed. 
If an offender is serving a sentence of probation, and 
receives an additional custodial sentence, the 
probation order continues in force so far as possible 
while the offender is in custody: s. 732.2(2)(a).  The 
court, in these circumstances, may extend the order of 
probation for a period of up to one additional year: s. 
732.2(5)(e).  It was the intention of Parliament that a 
probation order should continue to run despite the 
imposition of a subsequent sentence of incarceration.
Failing or refusing to comply with probation order, 
without reasonable excuse, is a hybrid offence. If 
proceeded by indictment a sentence of imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding two years may follow. A 
summary conviction may bring imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 18 months and/or a $2000 fine.
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2009 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2010 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2009” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• there were 2,161,313 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2009; this 
represents 43,330 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2008;
• the total crime rate dropped -3%. This includes a 
violent crime rate drop of -1% and a property 
crime rate drop of -4%;
• impaired driving  saw an increase of +3% to a 
total of 88,630 impaired driving  offences. Of 
those, 154 involved death and another 890 bodily 
harm.
YK
T-179.9
V-198.8
NV-322.1
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-149.4
V-155.2
NV-147.2
AB
T-104.7
V-105.0
NV-104.5
BC
T-110.3
V-109.8
NV-110.5
QC
T-82.0
V-81.0
NV-82.4
ON
T-68.9
V-81.5
NV-64.0
MB
T-131.1
V-175.4
NV-114.0
NWT
T-323.3
V-326.4
NV-322.1
NU
T-336.9
V-485.5
NV-279.8
NB
T-70.7
V-72.0
NV-70.2
NF
T-72.1
V-60.9
NV-76.4
NS
T-83.9
V-89.6
NV-81.6
PEI
T-65.5
V-44.0
NV-73.8
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2008 to 2009
SK 611 6,289 +1%
AB 477 17,597 0%
PEI 464 654 +39%
BC 384 17,099 +18%
NF 339 1,724 +8%
NS 335 3,142 +18%
NB 324 2,426 -11%
MB 303 3,706 +21%
QC 211 16,493 0%
ON 139 18,129 -4%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violnet CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2009”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 
2010.
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Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s population
33,739,859
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 550,183
Mischief 362,767
Break and Enter 205,710
Assault-level 1 181,570
Administration of Justice Violations 169,955
Disturb the Peace 118,815
Motor Vehicle Theft 108,172
Fraud 90,623
Impaired Driving 88,630
Uttering Threats 78,407
Homicide
There were 610 homicides reported, one less than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 178, followed by British Columbia (118), Alberta 
(95) and Quebec (88). Prince Edward Island reported 
none while the province of Newfoundland only 
reported one. The Yukon and the Northwest 
Territories each reported two homicides. As for 
provincial homicide rates, Manitoba had the highest 
(4.7 per 100,000 population) followed by 
Saskatchewan (3.5), Alberta and British Columbia 
(both at 2.6),  and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
(both at 1.6). As for Census Metropolitan Areas 
(CMA), Abbotsford-Mission, BC had the highest 
homicide rate at 5.2. The Canadian homicide rate 
was 1.8.
Canada
6,406
Top Ten CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 5.2 Edmonton, AB 2.6
Thunder Bay, ON 5.0 Vancouver, BC 2.6
Winnipeg, MB 4.1 Kingston, ON 2.5
Saguenay, QC 3.4 Greater Sudbury, ON 2.4
Halifax, NS 3.0 Saskatoon, SK 2.3
Volume 10 Issue 5 - September/October 2010
PAGE 44
Robbery
In 2009 there were 32,239 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 96 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, and Alberta. 
• robberies with a firearm accounted 
for 15% of all robberies while a 
knife was used in 30%;
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA rate of 
robbery in Canada (293), 26% higher than its 
2008  rate. Saguenay, QC had the lowest rate (24). 
Three Ontario CMAs reported jumps of more 
than +30% in robberies; Kingston (+52%), 
Guelph (+47%), and Greater Sudbury (+31%);
• two CMAs reported declines in robberies of more 
than -20%; Trois-Rivieres, QC (-27%) and St. 
John’s, NF (-25%).
Break and Enter
In 2009 there were 205,710 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 610 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break- in rate (1,973 ) 
followed by the Northwest Territories 
(1,651) and Saskatchewan (941). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2008 to 2009
MB 198 2,417 +25%
SK 120 1,235 -4%
BC 111 4,952 -10%
AB 100 3,706 -5%
ON 93 12,210 +1%
QC 86 6,759 -5%
NU 71 23 +26%
NS 62 584 +1%
NWT 30 13 -41%
YK 27 9 -45%
NB 26 197 -6%
NF 23 115 -16%
PEI 13 19 -22%
CANADA 96 32,239 -2%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 293 Montreal, QC 145
Regina, SK 214 Toronto, ON 134
Saskatoon, SK 204 Thunder Bay, ON 129
Vancouver, BC 152 Halifax, NS 199
Edmonton, AB 149 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 114
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2008 to 2009
NU 1,973 635 -5%
NWT 1,651 717 -16%
SK 941 9,698 -2%
MB 860 510 +3%
YK 761 256 -1%
BC 755 33,622 -15%
QC 744 58,282 +2%
AB 629 23,181 -3%
NF 566 2,881 +2%
NS 543 5,090 0
PEI 507 715 -12%
NB 463 3,470 -9%
ON 433 56,653 -4%
CANADA 610 205,710 -4%
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• break-ins accounted for nearly 15%  of all 
property crimes;
• 60% of break-ins were to a residence, 30% to a 
business location, and 10% to other locations, 
such as a shed or detached garage;
• residential break-ins dropped -2% while business 
break-ins declined -9%;
• the 2009 break-in rate was -42% lower than it 
was a decade ago;
• among  CMAs, Trois-Riveieres, QC reported the 
highest break-in rate (875) while Toronto reported 
the lowest (318). Peterborough, ON (+27%), 
Saguenay, QC (+21%), and Moncton, NB 
(+13%) all reported double digit increases in the 
break-in rate, while Abbotsford-Mission, BC 
(-37%), Victoria, BC (-29%), Saint John, NB 
(-24%), Sherbrooke, QC (-19%), Kingston, ON 
(-17%), Regina, SK (-16%), Thunder Bay, ON 
(-16%), Vancouver, BC (-13%), Windsor, ON 
(-11%), Guelph, ON (-10%), and Ottawa, ON 
(-10%) all had double digit drops.
Drugs
In 2009 there were 97,666 
drug-related crimes coming  to 
the attention of police. These 
offences included possession, 
t raf f icking, product ion or 
distribution. 
• p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n c e s 
accounted for 64,889 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(48,981); cocaine (7,543); 
and other drugs (8,365). 
Other drugs include 
heroin, crystal meth, and ecstasy;
• the trafficking, production, 
and distribution offences 
totaled 32,777 - cannabis 
(16,335); cocaine (9,923); 
and other drugs (6,519);
• British Columbia had the 
highest drug  related offence rates of all 10 
provinces for cannabis, cocaine and other drugs;
• the territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
• overall, drug  offences were down in 2009 (-6%) 
from 2008, mainly due to a -21% decline in 
cocaine offences.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Trois-Rivieres, QC 875 Vancouver, BC 787
Regina, SK 856 Brantford, ON 775
Saskatoon, SK 856 St. John’s, NF 766
Winnipeg, MB 810 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 727
Kelowna, BC 796 Gatineau, QC 713
12%
75%
13%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences       
by Drug Type
30%
50%
20%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & 
Distribution Offences     
by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 368 112 64
NS 211 34 46
SK 184 39 40
QC 183 24 48
NB 169 35 53
AB 168 83 32
NF 164 34 41
ON 151 42 39
MB 137 60 29
PEI 88 22 42
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NWT 935 262 129
NU 783 16 28
YK 395 155 62
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2009 there were 108,172 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down (-15%) from 125,568 in 
2008 and down -40% from  decade ago.
• on average there were 296 vehicles stolen per 
day in Canada in 2009;
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 321 per 100,000 
population
• the most vehicles were reported stolen in Quebec 
(27,517) while the Yukon had the fewest vehicles 
stolen (130);
• eight CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts greater than -20%; Winnipeg, MB (-34%), 
Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-33%), Peterborough, 
ON (-33%), Calgary, AB (-28%), Saint John, NB 
(-26%), Thunder Bay, ON (-23%), Halifax, NS 
(-22%), Regina, SK (-22%). 
Police Assaults
In 2009 there were 9,822 assaults reported against 
police officers, an average of about 27 per day. This 
number is up slightly from 9,806 in 2008. 
• over the last decade, from 1999 to 2009, assaults 
against police officers have risen +23%. 
WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
75 e-learning  activities:  making  online learning 
interactive.  
Ryan Watkins.
San Francisco : Pfeiffer, c2005.
LB 1044.87 W38 2005
The 2020 workplace:  how innovative companies 
attract, develop, and keep tomorrow's employees 
today.
Jeanne C. Meister and Karie Willyerd.
New York : Harper Business, c2010.
HF 5549.5 R44 M45 2010
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2008 to 2009
NU 593 191 +9%
NWT 536 233 -27%
MB 534 6,528 -28%
SK 517 5,326 -3%
AB 495 18,246 -20%
BC 440 19,614 -15%
YK 386 130 -25%
QC 351 27,517 -13%
ON 208 27,175 -13%
NB 172 1,288 0
NS 140 1,311 -17%
PEI 111 157 -8%
NF 90 456 +4%
CANADA 321 108,172 -15%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Brantford, ON 686 Saskatoon, SK 601
Kelowna, BC 659 Regina, SK 575
Winnipeg. MB 629 Vancouver, BC 464
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 622 Trois-Rivieres. QC 436
Edmonton, AB 601 Hamilton, ON 425
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Anger management for everyone:  seven proven 
ways to control anger and live a happier life. 
Raymond Chip Tafrate,  Howard Kassinove.
Atascadero, Calif. : Impact, c2009.
BF 575 A5 T35 2009
Before you say yes:  a guide to the pleasures and 
pitfalls of volunteer boards. 
Doreen Pendgracs ; foreword by Marian Hebb.
Toronto, Ont. : Dundurn Press, c2010.
HV 41 P463 2010
Campus attacks: targeted violence affecting 
institutions of higher education. 
by Diana A. Drysdale, William Modzeleski, Andre B. 
Simons.
Washington, D.C. : United States Secret Service : 
United States Dept. of Education : Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2010.
HV 6534 B53 D793 2010
Effective leadership [sound recording]: how to be 
a successful leader. 
John Adair.
[London, Eng. : Macmillan Digital Audio, 2010]
Leaders play an essential role in every aspect of our 
modern lives and good leadership is an art that is 
highly prized. Effective leaders not only control, 
appraise and analyse, they also encourage, improve 
and inspire. In Effective Leadership John Adair, 
Britain's foremost expert on leadership training, 
shows how every manager can learn to lead. 
Drawing  on numerous examples of leadership in 
action - commercial, historical, military - he 
identifies the essential requirements for good 
leadership and explains how you can enhance your 
personality, knowledge and position to become the 
best leader you can be.
BF 637 L4 A264 2010
Effective succession  planning: ensuring  leadership 
continuity and building talent from within.
William J. Rothwell.
New York : AMACOM, c2010.
HD 57.7 R689 2010
Five seconds at a time: how leaders can make the 
impossible possible. 
Denis Shackel with Tara Bradacs.
Toronto : HarperCollins Canada, c2010.
HD 38.2 S53 2010
Googling  security:  how much does Google know 
about you? 
Greg Conti.
Upper Saddle River, NJ : Addison-Wesley, c2009.
QA 76.9 A25 C667 2009
Groundswell:  winning  in a world transformed by 
social technologies. 
Charlene Li, Josh Bernoff.
Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business Press, c2008.
HF 5415.1265 L48 2008
The handbook for working  with difficult groups: 
how they are difficult, why they are difficult and 
what you can do about it. 
Sandy Schuman, editor.
San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass, c2010.
HD 42 H357 2010
How leaders speak:  essential  rules for engaging 
and inspiring others. 
by Jim Gray.
Toronto, Ont. : Dundurn Press, c2010.
HF 5718 G739 2010
How to succeed at an assessment centre: 
essential preparation for psychometric tests, 
group and role-play exercises, panel  interviews 
and presentations.
Harry Tolley, Robert Wood.
London ; Philadelphia, PA : Kogan Page, 2010.
HF 5549.5 E5 T65 2010
Managing  workplace bullying: how to identify, 
respond to and manage bullying  behavior in the 
workplace. 
Aryanne Oade.
Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
HF 5549.5 E43 O33 2009
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Open leadership:  how social technology can 
transform the way you lead. 
Charlene Li.
San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, c2010.
HD 57.7 L5 2010
Organizing for success.
Kenneth Zeigler.
New York : McGraw-Hill, c2010.
HD 69 T54 Z45 2010
The other kind of smart:  simple ways to boost 
your emotional intelligence for greater personal 
effectiveness and success.
Harvey Deutschendorf.
New York : AMACOM/American Management 
Association, c2009.
BF 576 D48 2009 
Post-traumatic stress.
Stephen Regel, Stephen Joseph.
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2010.
RC 552 P67 R44 2010
Preven t ing  and t r ea t ing  bu l l y ing  and 
victimization. 
edited by Eric M.
Vernberg, Bridget K. Biggs.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2010.
BF 637 B85 P74 2010
The reactor factor: how to handle difficult work 
situations without going nuclear. 
Marsha Petrie Sue.
Hoboken, N.J. : John Wiley & Sons, c2010.
HD 42 S837 2010
Switch: how to change things when change is 
hard.
Chip Heath and Dan Heath.
New York : Broadway Books, 2010.
BF 637 C4 H43 2010
The theory and practice of online learning.
edited by Terry Anderson.
Edmonton : AU Press, c2008.
LB 1028.5 T496 2008
Think again:  why good leaders make bad 
decisions and how to keep it from happening to 
you.
Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew 
Campbell.
Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business Press, c2008.
HD 30.23 F555 2008
Unforgettable experiential  activities: an Active 
Training resource. 
Mel Silberman.
San Francisco, CA : Pfeiffer, c2010.
HF 5549.5 T7 S553 2010 
Virtual training basics
Cindy Huggett.
Alexandria, Va. : ASTD Press ; London : Eurospan 
[distributor], 2010.
HF 5549.5 T7 H84 2010
When good men get angry.
Bill Perkins.
Carol Stream, Ill. : Tyndale House Publishers, c2009.
BF 575 A5 P49 2009
Win at work!: the everybody wins approach to 
confliction resolution.
Diane Katz.
Hoboken, N.J. : Wiley, c2010.
HD 42 K38 2010
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Abetting
“S. 21(1)(c) of the Criminal Code] 
does not involve physical acts of 
aiding ... . Abetting simply requires 
intentional encouragement, which may be by 
acts or words. ... Coming along to give “moral” 
support or company or encouragement can fit 
that.” - Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Cote in 
R. v. Hennessey,  2010 ABCA 274  at para. 39. 
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